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A TALE OF TWO INNOCENTS: CREATING AN
EQUITABLE BALANCE BETWEEN THE
RIGHTS OF FORMER OWNERS AND
GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS OF
STOLEN ART
ASHTON HAWKINS
RICHARD A ROTHMAN
DAVID B. GOLDSTEIN*
INTRODUCrION

A RT theft has probably been with us for almost1 as long as there

has been art, which is to say, virtually forever. As the value of
art transactions has expanded, now totalling billions of dollars annually, the theft of art and the trade in stolen art has kept pace.2 Stolen
art frequently returns to the stream of commerce, where it is often
obtained by an innocent good faith purchaser for value3 who is unaware of the theft many years ago. When the former owner 4 finally
locates the art in the possession of this good faith purchaser and commences an action against this innocent purchaser for conversion or
replevin,5 the courts are faced with the unpleasant dilemma of allocat* © 1995, Ashton Hawkins, Harvard Law School, J.D. 1962. Executive Vice
President and Counsel to the Trustees of The Metropolitan Museum of Art; Richard
A. Rothman, Washington University School of Law, J.D. 1977, partner, Well. Gotshal
& Manges; David B. Goldstein, Harvard Law School, J.D. 1985, associate. Weil, Gotshal & Manges. The authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Patricia D. Acha in the preparation of this article.
1. James Daly, Tracers of the Lost Art, Fbrbes, Oct. 10, 1994, at 21; William
Touhy, Picture This: Art Thievery Is Thriving, L.A. Tunes, Aug. 16. 1994, at H1, H4
("Art thefts, of course, have occurred since the first art objects were made .. ").
2. Daly, supra note 1, at 21. Art theft, with an estimated profit of $2 billion
annually, is the third most profitable crime behind drug smuggling and illegal arms
trading. Touhy, supra note 1, at H1; David Holmstrom, Stolen-Art Market Is a Big
Business at $2 Billion a Year, The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 11, 1994, at 1. Art
theft from museums alone is estimated at between $1 and $2 billion annually. Mary
Ann Marger, Artful Dodgers Face the Feds, St. Petersburg Tunes, Sept. 16, 1994, at 26.
3. For the purposes of this article, the term "purchaser" will refer to a good faith
purchaser for value or an innocent donee, such as a museum, unless otherwise
specified.
4. The term "owner" or "former owner" is used throughout this Article to denote an entity or person who is not in possession of a work of art, but is pursuing a
claim for recovery of that art or for damages based on a claim of prior possession or
superior title to the current holder of that art. The term is not meant to connote a
legal or moral judgment as to that claimant's right to the art.
5. Generally speaking, an act of conversion "is an unauthorized assumption and
exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another to the exclusion of
the owner's rights." 23 N.Y. Jur. 2d Conversion § 1 (1982) (citation omitted); see id.
§ 3; see also Sporn v. MCA Records, Inc., 448 N.E2d 1324, 1326 (N.Y. 1983) (stating
that an action for conversion constitutes a "denial of plaintiff's rights to the property
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ing rights and burdens between these two innocent victims of the
thief, who is typically either unknown or judgment-proof.6
At the heart of the stolen art problem-virtually dispositive in
many cases-is the question of the appropriate statute of limitations,
i.e., how long after the theft can the former owner sue the current
holder of the art? This problem arises from a fundamental principle
of law, combined with the unique attributes of art. Anglo-American
law is well-settled that neither a thief nor a good faith purchaser from
the thief, nor even subsequent good faith purchasers, can pass good
title.7 Indeed, the tort of conversion is unique in that it permits a
plaintiff to recover property or money damages from a defendant who
is by definition innocent of any wrongdoing or of inflicting harm on
the plaintiff, regardless of the defendant's ability to recover against
the actual wrongdoer. Despite this unusual situation, courts have, for
statute of limitations purposes, treated innocent purchasers no less
harshly-and often more harshly-than "guilty" tortfeasors.
The statute of limitations problem is heightened with respect to valuable works of art because, unlike most forms of personal property,
art is frequently nonperishable (often lasting for centuries); easily
transportable (the art trade, legitimate and otherwise, is notable for its
internationalism) and hence, easily concealed; readily identified;
nonfungible; and often of dramatically increasing value. Thus, it is not
uncommon for claims to recover stolen art to be made decades after
the theft, often against innocent purchasers.
Unfortunately, legal rules that allocate rights and burdens among
the parties involved in stolen art-both the guilty and the innocentremain mired in "horse-and-buggy law,"8 relying on ancient doctrines
ill-suited to respond to the modern stolen art problem. Judicial and
or possession of that property"); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts § 15, at 88, 93 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton] (discussing
methods by which a defendant may wrongfully acquire possession). Under New York
law, a replevin action "may be brought to try the right to possession of a chattel."
N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7101 (Consol. 1976). In other words, a replevin action is
brought to determine which party has the superior interest in the chattel, not which
party has undisputed legal title. David D. Siegel, New York Practice § 337 (2d ed.
1991). Historically, "[t]he origin and precise scope and nature of the action of replevin at common law are lost in antiquity and there has been doubt and controversy
concerning them rendering it impossible to be didactic." 12 Carmody-Wait § 82:2 (2d
ed. 1966).
6. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ("The resolution of
these problems is made the more difficult in view of the fact that one of two innocent
parties must bear the loss."), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967) (per
curiam), modification rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
7. See Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 833 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 229 & cmt.
d (1965); U.C.C. § 2-403(1) ("A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer.... ."); Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts,
§ 2.15A, at 186-87 (2d ed. 1986).
8. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 5, § 15, at 102 n.39; see also id. at 88-90 (tracing
historical development of tort of conversion); Harper, supra note 7, § 2.13, at 179
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legislative attempts to address this issue either have focused on a small
piece of the problem or have exacerbated the problem. This Article
proposes a comprehensive legislative solution based on a computerized art theft registry and focused on the reality-all too often ignored
by the courts-that the rights of two innocents are frequently at stake.
The 1991 decision of the New York Court of Appeals-the highest
court in the art market capital of the world-in Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell9 exemplifies this judicial failure to balance
the rights of the two innocents. In Guggenheim-an action to recover
a stolen painting from a good faith purchaser-the court held that the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the former owner
locates, demands, and is refused the return of its property, regardless
of the former owner's failure to exercise diligence in locating the stolen work. As a result of this decision, New York effectively has no
statute of limitations for the recovery of stolen property, and innocent
purchasers are perpetually at risk of a claim of theft by a former
owner.
Although the court in Guggenheim expressed a fear that a less
"owner-friendly" rule would turn New York into a haven for stolen
art,10 its decision instead threatens to turn New York into a haven for
questionable litigation of ancient claims," and thereby may have a
chilling effect on legitimate art transactions and art exhibitions in the
state. Moreover, rather than helping to solve or to ameliorate the
widespread and serious problems involving art theft, Guggenheim's
view of the law has exacerbated them, permitting former owners to
avoid taking the steps that might lead to the recovery of stolen art,
and thus preventing innocent purchasers of stolen art from becoming
new victims of the thief.
(noting "the incrustations of ancient lore associated with the tort of conversion" (cita-

tions omitted)).

9. 569 N.E.2d 426 (1991).
10. See id. at 431; see also Sydney M. Drum, Comment, DeWeerth v. Baldinger:
Making New York a Haven for Stolen Art?, 64 N.Y.U. L Rev. 909, 938-42 (1989)
(discussing the discovery or due diligence rule and stating that it promotes illicit trade
in stolen art); Alexander Stille, Was This Statue Stolen?, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 14, 1988, at 1
(discussing the increasing aggressiveness of foreign countries in protecting their "cultural property").
11. See e.g., Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991) (regarding
litigation commenced after the city made no effort to ascertain the whereabouts or
existence of its property for 19 years); Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian Land Co. of
America, 931 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1991) (regarding litigation commenced 18 years after
plaintiff learned that defendant had possession of the property); Republic of Turkey v.
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (concerning lawsuit
commenced 13 years after plaintiff learned the whereabouts of the property); see also
Charles D. Webb, Jr., Note, Whose Art is It Anyway? Title Disputes and Resolutions
in Art Theft Cases, 79 Ky. LJ. 883, 892-94 (1990-91) (arguing that the discovery or
due diligence rule will encourage filing of stale claims); Richard Perez-Pefila, The ArtLaw Center of the Universe, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1993, at B7 (discussing the attractiveness of New York City as a venue for ancient claims of stolen art); infra part 1.B
(discussing cases decided after Guggenheim).
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The fundamental flaw in Guggenheim, authored by then Chief
Judge Sol Wachtler, is its failure to consider that it had two "innocents" before it-the innocent theft victim and the innocent purchaser. Instead, the court absolved the former owner, as a matter of
law, of any duty of diligence under the applicable statute of limitations' 2 to attempt to locate its missing art.' The court harshly treated
the innocent purchaser as worse than the thief,1 4 holding that the innocent purchaser could challenge the owner's delay only through the
equitable defense of laches. Under a laches defense, the burden falls
on the purchaser to show that the former owner unreasonably delayed
in bringing suit and that the purchaser was unduly prejudiced by the
unreasonable delay.' 5 This fact-intensive inquiry can rarely be resolved without protracted litigation.' 6 Guggenheim simply failed to
give proper weight to the value of repose both to settled commercial
relations and to the proper functioning of the legal system.
Under Guggenheim's inflexible application of New York's unique
demand and refusal rule, former owners will be able to prevail over
innocent purchasers even after decades of inaction in attempting to

locate the missing work. Moreover, although Guggenheim itself was a
straightforward art theft case, New York is becoming a magnet for
litigation of a variety of ancient claims as plaintiffs seek to extend its
reasoning to matters having little or nothing to do with "stolen" art,
including patrimony claims brought by foreign governments, 7 claims
12. Under New York law, the statute of limitations for conversion or replevin is
three years. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(3) (McKinney 1990).
13. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991).
14. See id. at 429; infra note 53 and accompanying text.
15. See Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431. Prejudice, for purposes of laches, usually
entails either a significant loss of evidence or a material change in the defendant's
position as a result of plaintiff's delay. See infra part I.D.
16. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
17. Patrimony cases involve claims by foreign governments to obtain title to cultural property that allegedly was located within their borders and subject to a "cultural property" law purporting to vest ownership of all such property in the
government. Although most such cases do not involve actual theft, foreign governments seek to characterize the property as stolen in order to exploit United States law
to the effect that even a good faith purchaser cannot take title to "stolen" property.
See, e.g., Republic of Croatia v. Trustee of the Marquess of Northhampton, 610
N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (App. Div. 1994) (concerning Croatia and Hungary's unsuccessful
attempt to gain ownership of a treasure of unknown origins); Gary Taylor, Peru Relics
Prove Baffling to Prosecutors,Nat'l L.J., Oct. 30, 1989, at 8 (discussing Government of
Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989), a case concerning Peru's attempt
to assert legal ownership of artifacts seized by U.S. Customs Service from American
citizens).
Only patrimony claims based on ownership-as distinguished from a mere right to
expropriate or prohibit export-currently are even cognizable in the United States
courts, and there is sharp debate concerning the circumstances under which foreign
cultural property laws should be enforced in the United States. See generally Paul M.
Bator, An Essay on the InternationalTrade in Art, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 275, 310-66 (1982)
(evaluating existing and potential methods of regulating international art trade); John
H. Merryman, The Retention of CulturalProperty,21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 477, 479-82
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for misplaced art,"8 and claims by heirs challenging the validity of the
artists' original transactions. 19
As a direct result of Guggenheim, there is a growing concern on the
part of art dealers, collectors, and museums regarding art transactions
and exhibitions of artworks in New York. Guggenheim confirms that
the courts are institutionally ill-equipped to achieve a proper balance
of the competing interests at stake. Unless a proper balance is restored between the rights and duties of innocent former owners and
purchasers, New York's "worldwide reputation as a preeminent cultural center,"' including both the commerce and display of art, with
its many museums, galleries, private collectors, auction houses, and
resident artists, will be jeopardized.
The appropriate balancing of rights and duties among former owners, sellers, and purchasers would appear to require a legislative,
rather than a judicial, solution.2 ' Given that commerce in stolen art is
not a local or even a national phenomenon, an international solution
would, in theory, be most effective. Because of the difficulties of "legislating" on the international level, however, this Article proposes a
federal legislative solution to the art theft problem highlighted by
Guggenheim based on a computerized international art loss registry
using currently available technology. Alternatively, and recognizing
the difficulty of getting the attention of Congress to legislate in an
historical area of state power such as tort statutes of limitations,2 this
Article proposes that the State of New York adopt this proposal. The
(1988) (analyzing the objectives and policies of "foreign cultural property retention
schemes"). See also infra note 227 (discussing proposed UNIDROIT treaty to enforce
cultural property laws).
18. See e.g., Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131, 1134 (2d Cir. 1991) (concerning the city's claim against a restorer of Depression-era murals brought 19 years
after student rescued them from the trash during a school renovation).
19. See Richard Perez-Pefia, Settlement Over Artwork By an Ex-Slave, N.Y. Tunes,
Oct. 7, 1993, at Bl (concerning a settlement agreement between descendents of an
ex-slave, Bill Traylor, who was posthumously recognized as a great folk artist, and an
artist and gallery); Richard Perez-Pefa, Link to an Illustrious Past, and a Possible
Fortune,N.Y. Tmes, Dec. 9, 1992, at B1, B2 (detailing suit by heirs of Bill Traylor
against an artist and New York gallery for share of profits from Traylor's works); Judd
Tully, Bill Traylor Case Ends Amicably, ARTnewsletter, Nov. 16, 1993, at 4 (discussing settlement reached between heirs of Bill Traylor and the gallery and artist).
20. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991).
21. Any such legislation should avoid a definitive resolution of the unknowable
and metaphysical question, "What is Art?" Rather, this Article suggests that "art" is
self-defined by the participants by virtue of availing themselves of the statutory procedures proposed herein for recovery of stolen "art," and by a minimum value for access to those procedures.
22. Proposed and enacted international laws for the recovery of limited classes of

stolen art are discussed infra parts mI.C.I, Il.C.3.

23. Congress has enacted a statute of limitations under the Cultural Property Implementation Act ("CPIA"), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613, which applies to a very limited
category of foreign art objects, and which provides recovery rights only to foreign
governments. See infra part II.C.1.
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proposal may serve as a model for other jurisdictions. At a minimum,
and as a first step, the New York legislature should overrule Guggenheim and reallocate the rights and duties of the relevant parties with
respect to the limitations period based on a standard discovery rule.2 4
It must be understood that no solution, legislative or otherwise, will
be perfect. Under any legislation, some innocent party-whether the
former owner or the purchaser-will be saddled unfairly with a loss.
Unlike Guggenheim, however, which uniformly imposes the loss entirely on innocent purchasers while placing slight responsibility on former owners to avoid those losses, the legislative proposal outlined
here allocates responsibilities and burdens on the parties that can
most easily meet them and losses on the parties who are most able to
avoid or to mitigate them.2 5
More specifically, this article proposes that the accrual of the statute
of limitations for an art theft victim's claim for conversion or replevin
would depend on whether the former owner or subsequent purchaser
avails themself of the special procedures set forth in the proposed
statute. Under these procedures, a former owner who "registered"
expeditiously the stolen work with a confidential, user-financed international computerized stolen art registry2 6 would be protected against
a limitations claim by subsequent purchasers. Correspondingly, a purchaser who consulted the registry at the time of purchase would be
protected by a three-year limitations period from the date of
purchase.
Thus, a registered owner's time to commence suit would be tolled
indefinitely against a subsequent purchaser,2 7 so long as the owner exercised reasonable diligence in searching for the art, while the threeyear statute would begin to run in favor of the purchaser at the time
he checked the registry and found that the work in question had not
been registered. The registry would notify the registered owner that
an inquiry had been made by a prospective purchaser and confidential
records would be kept of such inquiries. If neither party availed itself
of the registry, the proposed statute would apply a discovery rule. Issues of retroactivity and lack of knowledge of the registries are also
addressed. 8
24. Under a discovery rule, the statute of limitations commences when the plain-

tiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts essential to assert a cause
of action. See infra part III.B.
25. This proposal is discussed in further detail, infra part V.
26. At the present time, the only such computerized registry is operated by the
International Art & Antiques Loss Register, a private, for-profit British corporation,
with offices in London and New York City. See infra notes 231-39 and accompanying
text.
27. Such a purchaser could not, by definition, be a good faith purchaser because
he either did not check the registry or ignored the results.
28. See infra part V.
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Part I of this Article analyzes Guggenheim and shows that New
York's demand and refusal rule, as applied in Guggenheim, unfairly
over-protects non-diligent owners as against innocent purchasers.
Part II reviews Guggenheim's predecessors and its progeny, and demonstrates that Guggenheim has incorrectly reinterpreted the demand
and refusal rule from a pro-purchaser to a pro-owner rule. Part m
critiques some of the alternative limitations doctrines available in balancing personal property rights in stolen unique chattel such as art,
and reviews various legislative proposals. Part IV discusses the technological availability of a computerized international stolen art reporting system that could help resolve the stolen art statute of
limitations problem. Part V details and analyzes the proposed legislative solution to the stolen art statute of limitations problem and explains why, although the proposal is not a cure-all to all timeliness
problems related to stolen art claims, it goes far in equitably balancing
the rights and burdens between former owners and good faith
purchasers.
I. Ti

GUGGENHEIM DECISION

A.

Background

Solomon R.Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell2 9 involved an action
for replevin, or, in the alternative, for conversion, brought by the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum (the "Guggenheim" or the "Museum") in New York City against Rachel Lubell in 1987.30 Sometime
after April 1965, a Chagall gouache3 ' was stolen from the Guggenheim.32 The painting was purchased in May 1967 by Ms. Lubell and
her since deceased husband from the prestigious Madison Avenue
Robert Elkon Gallery for $17,000.3 The Lubells were treated as innocent, good faith purchasers for value: they investigated the paint29. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
30. Id.at 428.
31. The gouache, painted by Marc Chagall in 1912, is known as Menageries or Le

Marchand de Bestiaux (The Cattle Dealer) and was painted in preparation for an oil
painting entitled Le Marchand de Bestiaux. Solomon R. Guggenheim donated the
gouache to the Museum in 1937. id.

32. The Guggenheim's accession card for the gouache indicates it was seen in the
Museum on April 2, 1965. The next (undated) entry notes that it was "missing." Id.;
Deposition of Vivian E. Barnett, Curator of the Guggenheim, at 24, 30-31 (Nov. 5,
1987) [hereinafter Barnett Dep.] (on file with Fordham Law Review). Although the
Guggenheim claimed that it only learned of the theft when it undertook a complete
inventory of the Museum collection in 1969-70, Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 428, there
was evidence that it knew the work was missing before 1967. Barnett Dep., at 44-48.
See also Richard Perez-Pefia, Guggenheim Presses Case on a Stolen Painting,N.Y.
Times, Dec. 27, 1993, at B1, B4 [hereinafter Perez-Pefla, Guggenheim Presses Case]
(commenting on the reasons why the painting may have been missing before 1967).
33. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 428.
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ing's provenance, paid fair market value, and publicly displayed the
painting.'
The Guggenheim took no steps to publicize the theft, nor did it inform any other museums, galleries, artistic organizations, or any law
enforcement authorities of the theft.35 Other than an apparent internal investigation, the Guggenheim did nothing to attempt to recover
the painting.36 The Museum "deaccessioned" the gouache in 1974,
thereby expunging
the work from the official inventory of the
37
Museum.

In August 1985, almost 20 years after its sale to the Lubells, the
Guggenheim fortuitously learned of the painting's location. 38 In January 1986, the Museum formally demanded that Ms. Lubell return the
gouache. She refused, and the Guggenheim commenced suit in September 1987 in the Supreme Court, New York County, seeking return
of the Chagall
gouache or, in the alternative, its then fair market value
39
of $200,000.

34. Id. The Elkon Gallery had purported provenance papers for the Lubells to
inspect; the Lubells publicly exhibited the painting at the Elkon Gallery in 1967 and
1981, and they openly displayed it in their home for over 20 years. Their investigation
of the provenance prior to purchase included contacting Chagall himself and Chagall
expert Franz Meyer, Director, Kunstmuseum, Basel, Switzerland. Id. at 431; see also
Perez-Pefia, Guggenheim Presses Case, supra note 32, at B1, B4 (discussing events
surrounding the purchase of the painting and the purchasers' investigation of its title).
35. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 428; Barnett Dep., supra note 32, at 52-58. The
Guggenheim did not inform its insurance company until 1970, three years after the
work was apparently discovered missing. Id. at 51-52, 60-61. Nor did the museum
inform the artist, Marc Chagall, or the Chagall expert, Franz Meyer, although both
were alive at the time. Id. at 54-57. Both Ms. Barnett, the curator, and Mr. Thomas
Messer, the Museum director, admitted that the common procedure in cases of theft
was to report it to the authorities. Id. at 75-76.
36. See Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 428. The Museum claimed that its inaction
was a "tactical decision based upon its belief that to publicize the theft would succeed
only in driving the gouache further underground and greatly diminishing the possibility that it would ever be recovered." Id. Alternatively, the Museum may simply have
been embarrassed that a Museum employee apparently walked off with the Chagall
and several other works by artists such as Pablo Picasso and Fernand Lger. PerezPefia, Guggenheim Presses Case, supra note 32, at B4; Barnett Dep., supra note 32, at
74-76.
37. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 428.
38. An art dealer had brought a transparency of the painting to Sotheby's for an
auction estimate. A former Guggenheim employee working at Sotheby's recognized
the painting and notified the Guggenheim. Id.
39. Id. Under New York law, the prevailing plaintiff is entitled to the fair market
value of the art at the time of trial, not the time of the theft. See Menzel v. List, 246
N.E.2d 742, 744-45 (N.Y. 1969). Lubell then impleaded the estate of Robert Elkon,
the owner of the Elkon Gallery, as a third party defendant, who interpleaded the
Gertrude Stein Gallery. See Perez-Pefia, Guggenheim Presses Case, supra note 32, at
B4. New York law permits the good faith purchaser to implead the seller, including
when the seller was also a good faith purchaser, for breach of implied warranty of
good title. See Menzel v. List, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (App. Div. 1967) (per curiam),
rev'd on other grounds, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
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The trial court granted Ms. Lubell's motion for summary judgment
based on a statute of limitations defense. The court, following
DeWeerth v. Baldinger,4° in which the Second Circuit interpreted New
York law as imposing on art theft victims a duty of reasonable diligence to attempt to locate stolen property,4 held that the Museum's
failure to do anything for twenty years except search its own premises
was unreasonable as a matter of law.42
The Appellate Division reversed, finding that, under New York's
demand and refusal rule, the trial court (and the Second Circuit) erred
in imposing a duty of reasonable diligence on the theft victim in the
context of a statute of limitations defense.43 The court found "it plain
that the relative possessory rights of the parties cannot depend upon
the mere lapse of time, no matter how long."44 Instead, the court held
that the issue of the Museum's diligence should be considered only in
the context of Lubell's equitable laches defense,45 in which Lubell
would have to show prejudice resulting from the Museum's unreasonable delay.' According to the Appellate Division, the three-year limitations period did not even begin to run until the missing property
was located, demand for its return had been made by the Museum,
and its return had been refused by Lubell.47
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
The New York State Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Appellate Division and adopted its reasoning on the statute of limitations issue. As enunciated by the court, "The rule in this State is that
a cause of action for replevin against the good-faith purchaser of a
stolen chattel accrues when the true owner makes demand for return
of the chattel and the person in possession of the chattel refuses to
return it."' The court explicitly rejected the holding in DeWeerth,
stating that "the Second Circuit should not have imposed a duty of
40. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).

41. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107-08.
42. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 428-29.
43. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621-22 (App.
Div. 1990), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
44. Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S. at 622 (emphasis added). Whether facetiously or not,
the court further remarked, "Indeed... delay alone could be viewed as having benefited [Lubell], in that it gave her that much more time to enjoy what she otherwise
would not have had." Il (citation omitted).
45. For a discussion of laches, see infra part I.D.
46. Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S. at 621. Lubell asserted that "the purchase of the
gouache constituted a prejudicial change of position," in that if the Guggenheim had
acted diligently, it would have recovered the gouache before Lubell had an opportunity to purchase it. Id at 622. The court assumed the validity of Lubell's prejudice
argument, but focused on open factual issues regarding the reasonableness of the Museum's actions and Lubell's own diligence. Id at 620-23.
47. Id. at 620.
48. Solomon R.Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991)
(citing Goodwin v. Wertheimer, 1 N.E. 404, 405 (1885); Cohen v. Keizer, Inc., 285
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reasonable diligence on the owners of stolen art work for purposes of
the Statute of Limitations."49 According to the court, the only obligation New York law imposes on the "true owner [is that] having discovered the location of its lost property, [the owner] cannot unreasonably
delay making demand upon the person in possession of that
property." 50
As the court recognized, the demand and refusal rule was judicially
created to protect good faith purchasers, not non-diligent owners:
"[u]ntil demand is made and refused, possession of the stolen property
... is not considered wrongful."'" In the absence of wrongdoing by
the purchaser, no cause of action for replevin exists against a good
faith purchaser until demand and refusal has occurred. The court then
leapt to the conclusion that the limitations period cannot begin prior
to refusal.5" The court noted the anomaly between the demand and
refusal rule and the rule that when the stolen property remains in the
possession of the thief, the statute "runs from the time of the theft,
even if the property owner was unaware of the theft at the time that it
occurred." 5 3 The court, however, otherwise failed to address or to justify this anomaly.
Although the court rejected Lubell's limitations defense, it agreed
with the Appellate Division that the Museum's lack of diligence could
be considered "in the context of [Lubell's] laches defense. The conduct of both [parties] will be relevant... and.., prejudice will also
need to be shown."5' 4 Finally, the court agreed with the Appellate Division that the burden of proof on Lubell's affirmative defense that
N.Y.S. 488, 489 (App. Div. 1936)). In fact, neither of these cases involved statute of
limitations issues.
49. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 429-30.

50. Id. at 430 (citation omitted).

51. Id. (citing Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28, 30-31 (1874); Menzel v. List, 267
N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966)).
52. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 430 (stating that "the demand and refusal is a substantive and not a procedural element of the cause of action"); see Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 620 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d
426 (N.Y. 1991).
53. 569 N.E.2d at 429 (citing Spor v. MCA Records, 448 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-27
(N.Y. 1983); Varga v. Credit-Suisse, 171 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676-77 (App. Div. 1958), aff'd,
155 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y. 1958)). The harshness of this result is ameliorated only in the
limited class of cases in which the thief actively concealed the theft (as opposed to the
identity of the thief or the location of the chattel), during which time of active concealment the statute is tolled. See, e.g., General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d
169, 171 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that one who conceals theft is estopped from asserting
statute of limitations defense). See generally In re Steyer, 521 N.E.2d 429, 430 (N.Y.
1988) (finding that a wrongdoer is estopped from asserting statute of limitations defense when he wrongfully concealed misconduct beyond the limitations period). But
see Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1163 & nn.23-24 (2d
Cir. 1982) (arguing that a thief is not treated more favorably than the good faith purchaser, and contending that a broad estoppel rationale underlies state court cases involving theft, which would prevent thief from asserting statute of limitations defense).
54. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431; Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
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the painting was not stolen rested on Lubell, not the Guggenheim. 55
The court then remanded the case for trial, for consideration of, inter
alia, Lubell's laches defense.5 6
C. Critique of Guggenheim
Guggenheim's statute of limitations rule for stolen property is not
only unique to New York,57 but it is not applied in any other area of
the law in New York.' 8 The Court of Appeals proffered several justifi55. 569 N.E.2d at 431. Lubell had argued that "[a]side from the Statute of Limitations" issue, the Museum had not presented proof that the painting was stolen. If the
Museum had disposed of the painting by sale or otherwise, then Lubell, as a good
faith purchaser, would have title superior to the Museum's. Guggenheim, 550
N.Y.S.2d at 623 ("[A]s both sides agree, if defendant is a good-faith purchaser and the
gouache was not stolen, then [Lubell's] title is superior to [the Guggenheim's].") (citing U.C.C. § 2-403(1) ("A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title
to a good faith purchaser for value.")). The possessor, however, need not establish
that the painting was not stolen if the claimant cannot first establish his prior ownership. See Republic of Croatia v. Trustee of the Marquess of Northhampton, 610
N.Y.S.2d 263, 264-65 (App. Div. 1994).
56. The case ultimately settled on the eve of trial on December 28, 1993.
Although the settlement terms are confidential, it has been reported that Lubell and
the two defendant galleries allegedly agreed to pay the Guggenheim $212,000 in damages in exchange for Lubell retaining possession of and obtaining title to the painting.
Andrew Decker, Guggenheim and Collector Resolve Suit over Chagall Gouache,
ARTnewsletter, Jan. 25, 1994, at 4-6; Constance Lowenthal, Art Crime Update, Wall
St. J., Feb. 18, 1994, at A10; Richard Perez-Pefia, An Art Museum and A Collector
Reach a Quiet Compromise, N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 2, 1994, § 4, at 2.
57. Although a few ancient cases in other jurisdictions required a demand before a
former owner could bring a conversion claim against a good faith purchaser, see
Burckhalter v. Mitchell, 3 S.E. 225, 226 (S.C. 1887); Parker v. Middlebrook, 24 Conn.
207, 210 (1855); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 229 cmt. h (1965); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 5, § 15, at 94 n.50; John G. Petrovich, Comment, The Recovery of
Stolen Art Of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 U.C.L.A. L Rev.
1122, 1135-36 (1980); see also infra note 67 (citing cases and commentary), the authors
are aware of no other jurisdiction today that holds that the limitations period against a
good faith purchaser of stolen property does not commence until demand and refusal.
See e.g., Christensen Grain, Inc. v. Garden City Coop. Equity Exch., 391 P.2d 81, 85
(Kan. 1964) (stating that conversion claim "accrued when [defendant] innocently
purchased the [stolen property] from the thief," thereby overruling demand and refusal rule of Daniel v. McLucas, 55 P. 680 (Kan. Ct. App. 1899)).
58. The New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules section 206(a) provides that,
when a demand is required, a cause of action accrues when the right to make the
demand is complete, ie., when the wrong is committed. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L & R.
§ 206(a) (McKinney 1990) (prior to 1991 amendment); id. at Practice Commentaries
to § 206:1; see also Federal Ins. Co. v. Fries, 355 N.Y.S.2d 741, 744 (Civ. Ct. 1974)
(stating minority rule that conversion occurs upon refusal of demand). In certain
specified cases, the right to make a demand is complete when the wrong is discovered,
which has been interpreted to mean when a reasonable person discovered or should
have discovered the wrong. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. Practice Commentaries to § 206:1
(McKinney 1990) (prior to 1991 amendment). The "discovery" rule applies to misappropriations by fiduciaries, id. § 206(a)(1), breach of bailment agreements, id.
§ 206(a)(2), and toxic exposures, id. § 214-c(2); see, e.g., Jensen v. General Elec. Co.,
623 N.E.2d 547, 551 (N.Y. 1993) (commencing statute of limitations in hazardous
waste suit from time when injury was discovered, pursuant to § 214-c(2)).
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cations for its unique application of the demand and refusal rule, each
of which are open to serious challenge on grounds of logic, policy, and
precedent. For example, the court noted that the demand and refusal
rule "affords the most protection to the true owners of stolen property."59 Although this statement is of course true, it begs the two central issues: whether unreasonably non-diligent former owners should
be entitled to the greatest possible protection against diligent, innocent purchasers, and how best to allocate the rights and duties between the two innocent parties. The court never explained the policy
behind, or rationale for, its rigid preference for the non-diligent former owner over the diligent purchaser, except for its conclusory and
unsubstantiated statement that any lesser protection
"would, we be''60
lieve, encourage illicit trafficking in stolen art.
In choosing a rule that affords the greatest possible protection to
former owners, the court also ignored the effect and intent of all statutes of limitations-to extinguish otherwise valid rights by dint of the
mere passage of time, regardless of the underlying merits of the claim.
The fundamental purposes of statutes of limitations are to prevent
stale claims, promote stability, and grant repose in commercial and
other relations.61 Unlike laches, statutes of limitations focus on the
objective actions of the claimant, not on (often subjective) harm or
prejudice to the defendant.62
59. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 430. By its choice of language-the prior holder

of the art is the "true owner"-the court can be seen as having pre-judged the outcome. See generally Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L.
Rev. 611, 637 (1988) (discussing why the "confusing search for the 'owner'" in property disputes often prejudices the outcome).
60. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431.
61. The New York Court of Appeals has emphasized that the primary purpose of
a limitations period is fairness to a defendant. Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp.,
248 N.E.2d 871, 872 (N.Y. 1969). A defendant should "be secure in his reasonable
expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought
not to be called on to resist a claim where the 'evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'" Id. (quoting Developments in the LawStatutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1185 (1950) (quoting Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944))); see Duffy v. Horton Memorial Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 820, 822-23 (N.Y. 1985) ("There is also the need to
protect the judicial system from the burden of adjudicating stale and groundless
claims."); see also DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing the burden of stale claims), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); O'Keeffe v. Snyder,
416 A.2d 862, 868 (NJ. 1980) ("The purpose of a statute of limitations is to 'stimulate
to activity and punish negligence' and 'promote repose by giving security and stability
to human affairs.' ") (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)); 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2538 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (discussing the burden of proof in
statute of limitation claims); Petrovich, supra note 57, at 1126-28 (discussing the three
policies for the statute of limitations).
62. Burnett v. N.Y. Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("Statutes of limitations
are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants."); Drum, supra note 10, at 937
(discussing that limitations claims are for the protection of defendants); Petrovich,
supra note 57, at 1127.
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Indeed, in sharp contrast to its decision in Guggenheim, the Court
of Appeals recently held that the statute of limitations in an accountant malpractice action "accrues upon the client's receipt of the accountant's work," not when the IRS assesses a deficiency. 63 The court
explained its decision based on a traditional view of limitations law
that is irreconcilable with its decision in Guggenheim:
The policies underlying a Statute of Limitations-fairness to defendant and society's interest in adjudication of viable claims not
subject to the vagaries of time and memory-demand a precise accrual date that can be uniformly applied, not one subject to debate
or negotiation.... [T]o base a limitations period on the potentiality
of IRS action defies the essential premise of temporal finality embodied in Statutes of Limitation... [and] "would mean turning our
backs on certainty and predictability .... ."64

The court in Guggenheim never explained why claims by non-diligent
owners to recover stolen personal property from innocent purchasers
should be exempted from the general application of statutes of limitations, thereby permitting an indefinite tolling of the limitations period
until that uncertain and unpredictable time when a former owner fortuitously discovers the location of the property.
The court also noted the existence of three alternative limitations
rules6s but rejected them for inconsistent reasons that have little to do
with the appropriateness of New York's unique demand and refusal
rule. These other approaches consisted of running the three-year period against the good faith purchaser from the time: (1) of the theft,
as is the case when the action is brought against the thief;6 (2) the
good faith purchaser obtains possession of the chattel (the majority
rule);67 or (3) the former owner discovered or through reasonabledili-

63. Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 644 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (N.Y. 1994).
64. Id. at 1012-13 (quoting Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 604 N.Y.S.2d 721, 721
(App. Div. 1993)).
65. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991).
66. Id. at 429; C. Clifford Allen, M & Patricia J. Lamkin, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against Action for Conversion of Propertyby Theft,
79 A.L.R.3d 847, 851, 853-54 (1977).
67. Federal Ins. Co. v. Fries, 355 N.Y.S.2d 741, 744 (Civ. Ct. 1974); 51 Am. Jur. 2d
Limitation ofActions § 125 (1970); Allen & Larmkin, supra note 66, at 851, 855-56; see
also DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1987) ("In virtually every state
except New York, an action for conversion accrues when a good faith purchaser acquires stolen property."); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (NJ. 1980) (discussing the running of the statute of limitations in the context of art theft); Prosser &
Keeton, supra note 5, § 15, at 93-94 (stating that although New York and "two or
three other states" require demand and refusal before conversion by a good faith
purchaser is complete, "the great weight of authority regards the mere acquisition of
the goods under such circumstances as in itself an assertion of an adverse claim, so
detrimental to the dominion of the owner that it completes the tort"). See generally
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 229 & cmt. h (1965) (stating the majority and minority rules). In some states, the accrual occurs at the the time of theft, e.g., Jackson v.
American Credit Bureau, Inc., 531 P.2d 932, 934-35 (Ariz. CL App. 1975); Becton
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983), whereas in other states,
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gence should have discovered the location of the stolen art (the standard discovery rule), as the Second Circuit held in DeWeerth.68
For example, the New York Court of Appeals relied on unenacted
legislation to conclude erroneously that New York had already considered and rejected a discovery rule.6 9 In fact, the proposed legislation
(the "Art Claim Bill"), which cleared both the State Assembly and
Senate in 1986,70 but which was vetoed by Governor Cuomo, 71 did not
propose to replace the demand and refusal rule with a discovery rule.
Rather, the Art Claim Bill, which applied only to certain not-forprofit institutions, provided that these institutions could trigger the
three-year statute of limitations to recover stolen art by providing notice, in the form of display or publication, that they were in possession
of the art.7 2 The Art Claim Bill focused on the actions of the holder of
the art, not on the actions of the claimant, as would a discovery rule.73
It contained an exception to the potential harshness of the notice prothe accrual occurs at the time of purchase, e.g., Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *25-26 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995); Christensen Grain, Inc. v.
Garden City Coop., Equity Exch., 391 P.2d 81, 83 (Kan. 1964); Palludin v. Bergin, 375
P.2d 544, 545 (Nev. 1962).
68. In addition to the Second Circuit, courts in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and New
Jersey have explicitly adopted a standard discovery rule for stolen art work. See Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *28 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
23, 1995); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fime Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1388-91 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th
Cir. 1990); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869-70 (N.J. 1980); see also Mucha v.
King, 792 F.2d 602, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing applicability of Illinois discovery
rule to conversion of bailed property). In 1982, California enacted by statute a discovery rule for stolen art claims, which was expanded in 1989 to include any "article
of historical, interpretative, scientific or artistic significance." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 338(c) (West Supp. 1994). Although the California courts have not interpreted this
particular rule, they generally impose a duty of reasonable diligence in conjunction
with a discovery rule. See, e.g., Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923, 927 (Cal. 1988)
(stating that "[a] plaintiff is held to her actual knowledge as well as knowledge that
could reasonably be discovered through investigation of sources open to her"). Ohio
and Oklahoma have adopted a discovery rule for recovery of stolen property claims
generally. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.09 (Page 1991) (amended 1994); Firsdon
v. Mid-American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. 90-WD083, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS
4808, at *1 (Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1991);'In re 1973 John Deere 4030 Tractor, 816 P.2d
1126, 1132-33 (Okla. 1991).
69. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 430.
70. New York State Bill A. 11462-A, S. 3274-B, 209th Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Art
Claim Bill] (on file with Fordham Law Review); see infra part III.C.2.
71. Veto Message No. 22, New York State Governor's 1986 Veto Messages, at 863
(Mario M. Cuomo) [hereinafter Veto Message] (on file with Fordham Law Review);
see also Irvin Molotsky, 3 U.S. Agencies Urge Veto of Art-Claim Bill, N.Y. Times, July
23, 1986, at C15 (discussing recommendations by federal agencies with respect to the
Art Claim Bill).
72. Art Claim Bill, supra note 70, § 214-d(a).
73. The Governor's veto message similarly addressed the inadequacy of the notice, rather than the reasonableness of the former owner's conduct. The Governor
was also swayed by the U.S. State Department's concern that the bill would have
resulted in New York becoming "a haven for cultural property stolen abroad since
such objects [would] be immune from recovery." Veto Message, supra note 71, at 863.
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vision based on a discovery rule,74 but was vetoed despite the ameliorative discovery exception, not because of it 75 In short, New York's
legislature and Governor have not considered, let alone rejected,
adoption of a discovery rule to replace the demand and refusal rule.
The Court of Appeals then proceeded to turn the demand and refusal rule on its head by holding "that there is no reason to obscure its
straightforward protection of true owners by creating a duty of reasonable diligence. ' '7 6 In fact, the New York courts originally crafted
the demand and refusal rule to protect good faith purchasers, not former owners. The creation of the rule was wholly unrelated to statute
of limitations concerns. 77 The purpose of the rule-at a time when
merely being hauled into court might be viewed as damaging to one's
reputation-was to avoid stigmatizing the innocent purchaser as a
wrongdoer before he had an opportunity to make amends. 7 The
courts reasoned that until a demand for the return of property had
been made and refused, the good faith purchaser had done nothing
wrong.79 Thus, the courts created and used the rule to dismiss former
owners' claims for return of property, where the owner had brought
suit before the purchaser refused to return the property.8s
Not until almost a century after its creation, in Menzel v. List 8 -a
case involving stolen art-was the demand and refusal rule converted
from a shield for innocent purchasers into a sword for former owners.
Guggenheim adopted Menzel's simplistic syllogism: if the innocent
purchaser could not be sued until demand and refusal had been made,
then the former owner could sue within three years of refusal, regardless of the passage of time from the taking of the property until the
74. Art Claim Bill, supra note 70, § 214-d(d).
75. Veto Message, supra note 71, at 863.
76. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991).
77. For further discussion of the origins and development of New York's demand
and refusal rule, see infra part H.A; see also DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103,
108-09 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing the purposes behind the demand and refusal rule as
for the protection of innocent parties), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); GUllet v.
Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28,33-34 (1874) (characterizing the demand and refusal rule as reasonable and just for the protection of the innocent purchaser).
78. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § C206:1 (McKinney 1990) ("[T]o avoid stigmatizing
an innocent purchaser as a tort feasor, he is not liable for conversion until the plaintiff
makes a demand upon him that is ignored." (citing Berman v. Goldsmith, 529
N.Y.S.2d 115 (App. Div. 1988))).
79. Gillet, 57 N.Y. at 34; Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp.
829, 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[B]ona fide purchaser's possession is initially lawful, and
only becomes unlawful once he has refused, upon demand, to return the property to
the true owner." (citations omitted)), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
80. Gillet, 57 N.Y. at 34.
81. 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964) (per curiam). This Article cites four
different Menzel opinions. Procedurally, the above-cited opinion affirmed the denial
of a pretrial motion to dismiss, while the latter three concerned post-trial proceedings.
See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608
(App. Div. 1967) (per curiam), modification rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
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demand. Nothing in the text of the statute of limitations 82 or in the
policy or origins behind this originally pro-purchaser rule requires the
tolling of the statute of limitations on the former owner's behalf until
demand and refusal.83 Indeed, the illogic of the Guggenheim result,
which favors the thief and the bad faith purchaser over the innocent
purchaser, was recognized over a century ago.' The court's harsh
treatment of the innocent purchaser is exacerbated by the rule that
damages are measured by the current value of the art (in this case,
$200,000), rather than at the time of the theft or purchase ($17,000).85
Even if one were to accept the "logic" that a replevin cause of action does not accrue against an innocent purchaser until demand and
refusal, nothing in the policy or logic of the rule compels the rejection
of a duty of reasonable diligence on a former owner seeking to invoke
the demand and refusal rule and the judicial nullification of the statute
of limitations. 86 In short, nothing in the text, precedent, policy, or
logic leads to the unprecedented and inflexible rule articulated in
Guggenheim.
Without analysis or explanation, the court further asserted that "it
would not be prudent to... impose the additional duty of diligence
before the true owner has reason to know where its missing chattel is
82. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214 (McKinney 1990) ("The following action
must be commenced within three years: . . . 3. an action to recover a chattel or
damages for the taking or detaining of a chattel .... "). As noted, § 206(a) states that
the limitations period accrues when the right to make demand occurs. See supra note
58.
83. The court in Guggenheim could just as easily have treated the absence of a
demand as an affirmative defense, unrelated to the former owner's right to bring an
action. See, e.g., Atlas Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 183 A. 690, 693 (Conn. 1936).
84. See Harpending v. Meyer, 55 Cal. 555, 561 (1880) (en banc). The court stated:
[T]he operation of a rule which exempts a bona fide purchaser from being
sued until after demand [is] made, is, in all the cases to which it has been
applied, favorable to the bona fide purchaser, and it is claimed to have been
devised for his protection. If applied to this case, its operation is exactly the
reverse of that. To hold that the statute did not commence running in favor
of these defendants from the time of the delivery of the goods to them, because at that time they were conscious of no wrong-doing, which, if they had
been conscious of, would have set the statute in motion in their favor, involves an absurdity.... We are unwilling to give a conscious wrong-doer
any advantage over a constructive wrong-doer.
Id.
85. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubel, 569 N.E.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. 1991);
Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 744-45 (1969), rev'g 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div.
1967), modifying 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966). This harshness may be ameliorated in some cases by the right to recover this amount from the seller, but the seller
may be unavailable, judgment-proof, or itself a good faith purchaser. See Menzel, 267
N.Y.S.2d at 809. The statute of limitations in this type of third party action commences at the time of demand and refusal in the underlying action, on the rationale
that quiet title is not disturbed until that time, and hence, the warranty of quiet title
has not previously been broken. See Menzel, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 609; supra note 39.
86. See, e.g., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1987) (expressing
view that New York Court of Appeals would impose a duty of reasonable diligence in
attempting to locate stolen property).
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to be found." s Under the Guggenheim rule, however, whether the
former owner has reason to know the location of the missing chattel is
irrelevant; that formulation, of course, is the traditional discovery rule
that was expressly rejected in Guggenheim. Indeed, the former owner
is under no duty to exercise diligence even after it has reason to know
the location of the stolen art. The requirement of diligence in making
a demand arises only when the former owner actually knows where
the chattel is located, regardless of any efforts, reasonable or otherwise, to locate it.8 The court, however, never explains why it would
"not be prudent" to impose a duty of reasonable diligence-as is typically required under a discovery rule-from the time the former
owner learns of the theft, or at least from the point when a reasonable
person would have discovered the location of the art.
The court then concluded its statute of limitations analysis by contrasting its rule with an unusual description of the discovery rule, stating that "[t]hree years after the theft, any purchaser, good faith or not,
would be able to hold onto stolen art work unless the true owner was
able to establish that it had undertaken a reasonable search for the
missing art."' 9 The court never explained: (1) why the alternative to
demand and refusal should be a limitations period that accrued from
the time of the theft, rather than from the purchase, as in most jurisdictions; 9° (2) why a badfaith purchaser should be entitled to invoke a
limitations rule designed to protect good faith purchasers; 91 and (3)
why it is so unfair to terminate the rights of an unreasonably nondiligent owner at the expiration of a statutorily-defined limitations period as against an innocent purchaser.
The driving force behind Guggenheim's inflexible demand and refusal rule appears to be that any lesser protection for non-diligent
owners would "encourage illicit trafficking in stolen art."' 2 No evidence, however, exists for this proposition. New York is apparently
the only state in which the limitations period commences after demand and refusal, yet there is no evidence that any less owner-friendly
jurisdictions have become havens for stolen art, or that New York's
87. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991)
(emphasis added).
88. Id. ("[T]he true owner, having discovered the location of its lost property, cannot unreasonably delay making demand upon the person in possession of that property." (emphasis added)).
89. Id. at 431.
90. See supra note 67.
91. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1391 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (concluding that discovery
rule was inapplicable to a bad faith purchaser due to fraudulent concealment), aff'd,
917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).

92. 569 N.E.2d at 431; id. at 430 (quoting statement from Governor Cuomo's veto
of the very different Art Claim Bill that "the bill, if it went into effect, would have
caused New York to become 'a haven for cultural property stolen abroad ... .' "); see
also supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing Cuomo's veto).
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demand and refusal rule, first applied to protect former owners in
1964, 93 has discouraged trade in stolen art in New York.
Indeed, the belief that the demand and refusal rule would discourage art theft or cause purchasers to be more prudent is counter-intuitive. Under Guggenheim, a good faith purchaser is treated worse than
a thief or a bad faith purchaser. Thus, there is a disincentive to make
an expensive, time-consuming investigation into provenance, particularly given that such investigations are often inconclusive. 94 Moreover, because Guggenheim does not obligate the owner to report or to
publicize the theft, the investigatory burdens that Guggenheim unfairly places solely on purchasers is less likely to reveal the former
owner's identity. By contrast, a rule that rewards a good faith purchaser, as opposed to a bad faith purchaser, and that encourages former owners to come forward so that a provenance search would more
likely lead to the theft victim, would more logically accomplish Guggenheim's professed policy goals. The primary effects of Guggenheim
in New York are likely to be an increase in burdensome litigation of
stale claims that could not be brought in any other jurisdiction and a
disincentive for legitimate art dealers, exhibitors, and collectors to be
active in the New York art market.
D. The Laches Defense
As noted, Guggenheim does not foreclose an innocent purchaser
from invoking a laches defense. Laches is a common law affirmative
equitable defense that is typically used to mitigate the rigidity of a
statute of limitations when defendants have been prejudiced by plaintiffs who "slumber[ed] on their rights."'95 Laches has traditionally
been applied only when the plaintiff seeks equitable relief,96 and when
the plaintiff has brought a claim within the applicable statute of limita93. Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S. 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964) (per curiam).
94. For example, the Lubells' good faith investigation failed to reveal the Guggenheim's prior possession of the Chagall. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550
N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
95. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1965); Webb, supra
note 11, at 884 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 875 (6th ed. 1990)).
96. As an equitable defense, laches traditionally has not been available in an action at law, such as a conversion claim for damages. See Gonzalez v. Chaplin, 552
N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (App. Div. 1990); Appleton v. National Park Bank of N.Y., 208
N.Y.S. 228, 233 (App. Div.), aff'd, 150 N.E. 555 (N.Y. 1925). The court in Guggenheim did not address whether laches could be raised as a defense to Lubell's conversion claim, or only to the replevin claim for return of the painting. Although replevin
is generally a legal, not an equitable, cause of action, in cases of "unique chattel,"
New York courts employ a hybrid doctrine of "equitable replevin," allowing injunctive relief and equitable defenses, such as laches. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. Practice
Commentaries, § C206:1 (McKinney Supp. 1995). There does not appear to be any
similar exception for a conversion claim for damages.
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tions period. 7 Unlike a statute of limitations, laches is committed to
the discretion of the court based on all the equities.9"

The laches doctrine requires a defendant to prove both the plaintiff's unreasonable and inexcusable delay in commencing suit and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from that delay,99 i.e., reliance on
the other party's inaction that results in a harmful change of circumstance to the defendant. 10 In assessing delay under the laches doctrine, "the focus is on the reasonableness of a plaintiff's delay rather
than on its length." ' Reasonableness of the plaintiff's delay focuses
on such fact determinations as the measures that plaintiff actually
took, the measures potentially available to the plaintiff, and the measures the plaintiff should have taken.lca It is in the context of this "reasonableness" inquiry that courts consider the extent of the plaintiff's
diligence.' 03 Whereas the plaintiff's diligence (or lack thereof) ends
the inquiry under the discovery rule, laches requires the court to go on
to consider whether the plaintiff's lack of diligence prejudiced the
defendant.
There are two general categories of cognizable prejudice to support
a defense of laches: (1) loss of evidence that would support the defendant's position, such as lost documents, death of witnesses, or
faded memories,' °4 and (2) a material change in the defendant's position that would not have occurred but for the delay, including changes
97. Cf 1 Jack B. Weinstein et al., New York Civil Practice 213.07 (1995) (stating
that the doctrine of laches is used to bar equitable relief even when the claim is
brought within the limitations period if unreasonable delay caused prejudice to
defendant).
98. See, e.g., Goodfarb v. Freedman, 431 N.Y.S.2d 573, 578 (App. Div. 1980) (stating that the equities include" 'all the facts and circumstances which help to show what
is just and right between the parties"' (quoting Forstmann v. Jormy Holding Co., 154
N.E. 652, 655 (1926) (Pound, J.))).
99. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994); In re Barabash, 286
N.E.2d 268, 271 (N.Y. 1972) ("The essential element of this equitable defense is delay
prejudicial to the opposing party."); Augustine v. Szwed, 432 N.Y.S.2d 962,965 (App.
Div. 1980); 75 N.Y. Jur. 2d Limitations & Laches § 337, at 544 (1988).
100. Weinstein, supra note 97, 213.07, at 2-332; see Sorrentino v. Mierzva, 302
N.Y.S.2d 565, 569-70 (App. Div. 1969).
101. DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 553.
102. See generally DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 553 (acknowledging the "particularly
fact sensitive nature of the laches inquiry"); Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v.
Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 849-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that political and historical
factors may mitigate plaintiff's delay), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); Solomon R.
Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 622 (App. Div. 1990) (questioning
whether plaintiff's failure to search actively for painting was unreasonable), aff'd, 569
N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
103. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431; Varconi v. Unity Television Corp., 173
N.Y.S.2d 201, 206 (Sup. CL 1958).
104. When there has been such a delay as to cause loss of evidence or death of
witnesses, the prejudice to the defendant is exactly the type of harm that the statute of
limitations' policy of repose from stale claims seeks to avoid. Burnett v. New York
Central R.R, 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965). The difference is that the statute of limitations
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in the law, a change of title, or other intervening equities or harm
caused by the plaintiff's delay. 10 5 It has been suggested that a museum could claim laches as a result of suffering a "lost opportunity
cost" if it refrained from acquiring similar works because it believed it
already owned those in its possession. 0 6 Lubell argued that her
purchase of the painting itself was a material prejudicial change in
circumstance caused by the Guggenheim's unreasonable conduct-an
issue that was not resolved. 107 A purchaser might be able to assert
prejudice if the former owner's unreasonable delay led to an inability
to recover against an insolvent or unavailable seller.'08 Lapse of time,
however, no matter how long, cannot by itself constitute laches. 10 9
The difficult evidentiary burdens imposed on a defendant to prove
both unreasonable delay and prejudice inevitably burden the judicial
system with long, complex litigations." 0 Moreover, because a laches
inquiry is "particularly fact sensitive," and "[without] any objective
standard,""' it is generally not resolvable without a trial.
Although a long passage of time would appear to suggest prejudice
to a defendant by the loss of proof, including loss of witnesses, which
conclusively presumes prejudice from the mere passage of time, while laches requires
the defendant to prove actual prejudice.
105. See, e.g., Robins Island Preservation Fund v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d
409, 424 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that overturning a 200-year chain of title would cause
gross prejudice to the defendant), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 603 (1993); DeWeerth, 804 F.
Supp. at 553 (stating that prejudice "may take several forms," including that "defendant may have changed position in reliance upon the absence of a suit"); Meyer v.
Meyer, 426 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that plaintiff's three year
delay in bringing suit would result in payment schedule which would prejudice defendant); 75 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Limitations & Laches §§ 337-338 (1989). Mere emotional
loss, however, is not enough to show prejudice. See DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 554.
106. Ildiko P. DeAngelis, "Old" Loans: Laches to the Rescue?, C723 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
301 (Mar. 25, 1992); Agnes Tabah, The Practicalitiesof Resolving "Old" Loans:
Guidelinesfor Museums, C723 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 315 (Mar. 25, 1992). The Tabah article
also suggests that the cost of maintaining, preserving, and restoring the works may be
an element of prejudice, but presumably a court would require the former owner to
reimburse the possessor for the value of these services before recovering the art. Id.;
see Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131, 1133 (2d Cir. 1991) (remanding for
determination of value of restoration services, after rejecting restorers claim to
mural).
107. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 622-23 (App.
Div. 1990), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991); see also Robins Island, 959 F.2d at 424
(upholding laches defense where "[i]t is unlikely that [defendant] would have
purchased the property had it known its title was in dispute").
108. Cf. DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 552-53 (favoring rejection of a laches claim because of the presence of a "nonbankrupt third party defendant").
109. Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 622; Weinstein, supra note 97, 1 213.07, at 2-331
("In order to invoke the doctrine of laches, the time lapse must be more than mere
delay; it must be delay that causes prejudice or disadvantage.").
110. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1994); Guggenheim,
550 N.Y.S.2d at 622-24 (noting the numerous open factual issues which must be resolved to establish laches).
111. DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 553.
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would greatly increase the difficulty of defending a claim,' 1 2 courts in
fact have not permitted a laches defense as a matter of law to prevent
a recovery of long-missing works of art. 1 3 In Guggenheim, for example, it would have been difficult for Lubell, who bought the painting
close to the time of the theft, to establish that she had purchased the
painting as a result of the Guggenheim's unreasonable inaction or that
she had suffered other cognizable prejudice as a result of the Guggenheim's dereliction.
H. GUGGENHEIM'S PREDECESSORS AND ITS PROGENY
Guggenheim and its predecessors present a textbook example of the
evolution of a judicial doctrine-whether consciously and deliberately
or accidentally-from one purpose to its diametric opposite. As this
part reveals, the judicially-created demand and refusal rule originated
to protect good faith purchasers from suit until they had refused an
opportunity to return property to the claimant. This part then shows
how, without analysis or explanation, Menzel v. List"' turned this
doctrine on its head, but left open the critical question of the former
owner's duty of diligence. Although several subsequent federal and
state court decisions either simply ignored Menzel or recognized and
addressed this open issue, the Court of Appeals in Guggenheim
treated Menzel's pro-owner orientation of the demand and refusal
rule as settled historical fact, with "no reason" to create "a duty of
reasonable diligence."11 5 Finally, this part discusses the post-Guggen-

heim efforts of plaintiffs to exploit Guggenheim in pursuit of long-dormant claims to valuable art.
A. Development of the Demand and Refusal Rule
As discussed in part I.C., the demand and refusal rule, as first enunciated in Gillet v. Roberts, 16 was originally developed and applied by
New York courts to protect good faith purchasers from being hauled
112. DeAngelis, supra note 106, at 301; Webb, supra note 11, at 895.
113. See, ag., Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131, 1138 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that although laches defense had not been expressly asserted at trial, Hoelzer
"would have failed to establish the prejudice necessary to sustain such a claim");
DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 553 (denying laches defense after bench trial of painting
stolen almost 40 years earlier); Solomon tR Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d
426 (N.Y. 1991) (remanding case for trial on laches issue of painting stolen 20 years
earlier).
114. 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964).
115. 569 N.E. 2d at 430.
116. 57 N.Y. 28, 33 (1874). As the New York Court of Appeals held: "[Ain innocent purchaser of personal property from a wrong-doer shall first be informed of the
defect in his title, and have an opportunity to deliver the property to the true owner,
before he shall be made liable as a tortfeasor for a wrongful conversion." Id. at 34.
In Gillet, the owner of timber demanded its return from a bona fide purchaser, who
did not refuse to surrender the timber. The owner, however, did not take possession
and tried to sue the purchaser for conversion of the timber. The owner then negli-
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into court prior to engaging in a knowingly wrongful act-refusing a
demand by the former owner for return of his property. 1 7 For decades, the rule was neither used nor intended as a means to toll the
statute of limitations on behalf of owners (diligent or otherwise) as
against innocent holders of personal property.
The courts further held that a demand is not necessary when the
converter takes possession with knowledge of the plaintiff's claim to
the property," 8 or "when the holder exercises an act of ownership
inconsistent with the ownership and dominion of the true owner."119
Accordingly, in the case of the thief or other "bad faith" converter,
the conversion occurs at the time of the exercise of dominion over the
property, not at the time of a subsequent demand for its return. In
such cases, the statute of limitations commences at the time of
the
20
physical possession, not at the time of the subsequent demand.1
Prior to Menzel, with one apparent exception,' 2 ' the courts in New
York did not consider that the limitations period commenced against a
good faith purchaser only upon demand and refusal. In Watkins v.
Madison County Trust & Deposit Co.," for example, the Second Cirgently failed to retrieve the timber from the river where the purchaser had delivered
it. Id. at 31-33.
117. See, e.g., MacDonnell v. Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 85 N.E. 801,
803 (N.Y. 1908) ("The rule that one who comes lawfully into possession of property
cannot be charged with conversion thereof, until after a demand and refusal, is too
well established to justify extended discussion.... But it has no application in a case
where the lawful custodian of property commits an overt and positive act of conversion by an unlawful sale or disposition of the same." (citations omitted)); Tompkins v.
Fonda Glove Lining Co., 80 N.E. 933, 934 (N.Y. 1907) (requiring demand upon defendant who "comes lawfully into the possession" of property, although apparently
also finding defendant not to be a good faith purchaser); Goodwin v. Wertheimer, 1
N.E. 404, 405 (N.Y. 1885) (cited in Guggenheim) ("The original possession.., not
[being] tortious .... it was necessary to change the character of his possession by a
demand and refusal, before the plaintiffs could maintain an action.., for conversion
....
");Hamilton Assets Corp. v. Kirshberg, 158 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808 (App. Div. 1956)
(affining dismissal of a complaint for conversion in the absence of a demand and
refusal); Cohen v. Keizer, 285 N.Y.S. 488,489 (App. Div. 1936) (cited in Guggenheim)
(holding that a good faith purchaser is not liable for conversion in the absence of
demand for return of property); Branch v. Latham, 174 N.Y.S. 295, 297 (App. Div.
1919) (same); see also supra note 57 (citing cases and commentary concerning demand
and refusal rule in other jurisdictions).
118. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Troy, 126 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454 (App. Div. 1953).
119. Del Piccolo v. Newburger, 9 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (App. Div. 1939); accord, Goebel v. Clark, 275 N.Y.S. 43, 47 (App. Div. 1934).
120. MacDonnell, 85 N.E. at 803 (holding that statute of limitations commences
when lawful custodian attempts to transfer property for his own benefit, which act
"was a distinct and unequivocal conversion," for which "[n]o demand was necessary"); Lightfoot v. Davis, 91 N.E. 582, (N.Y. 1910) (denying conversion claim because statute of limitations had commenced at the time of theft).
121. Duryea v. Andrews, 12 N.Y.S. 42, 43 (App. Div. 1890). In a three sentence
opinion, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until demand for delivery of a stolen horse. The opinion is without citations, and it is unclear
whether the possessor was a good faith purchaser.
122. 24 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.).
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cult applied New York law and held that the statute of limitations for
conversion commenced against a good faith recipient of property from
the time of the possession and not from the date of demand and refusal. 1 3 The court did not directly address the interplay between the
demand and refusal rule as a requirement to bring suit and as an
accrual rule for purposes of the statute of limitations. Rather, in addressing the statute of limitations issue, the court assumed the plaintiff's perspective-that defendant's possession was wrongful from the
time of the possession.124 Commencing the statute of limitations at
the time of the defendant's allegedly wrongful possession is perfectly
consistent with the requirement of demand and refusal prior to bringing suit: a former owner should not be able to haul an innocent purchaser into court until the former owner has put the purchaser on
notice of his putative wrong, but the former owner's time to bring suit
runs from the time of the possession that the owner claims is
wrongful. 125

The impact of the demand and refusal rule on the commencement
of the limitations period would appear to be resolved by New York's
Civil Practice Law and Rules section 206(a), which provides that
"where a demand is necessary to entitle a person to commence an
action, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be
computed from the time when the right to make the demand is complete."' 26 The right to make demand is complete when a good faith
purchaser exercises control over property in a manner inconsistent
with the former owner's rights, even if the ability to make demand is
prevented by lack of knowledge of the identity of the possessor.
In 1964, however, the Appellate Division in Menzel rejected the application of section 206(a) to conversion claims and turned the prior
demand and refusal caselaw on its head, converting it from a shield for
123. Id. at 371.
124. Id. (stating that statute of limitations for conversion had begun to run "because the possession was wrongful from the outset, and no subscquent demand and
refusal could start it afresh" (citations omitted)). See also Ganley v. Troy City Nat'l
Bank, 98 N.Y. 487,494 (1885) (holding that when conversion is committed at time of
sale, "statute of limitations commences to run from the time of the conversion and not
the time of the subsequent demand"); Smith v. Staten Island Land Co., 162 N.Y.S.

681, 684, 692-93 (App. Div. 1916) (finding that a conversion claim against good faith
purchasers commenced to run at the time of purchase, "regardless of whether or not
[plaintiff] had notice of the conversion" (citations omitted)).
125. See Williams v. Flagg Storage Warehouse Co., 220 N.Y.S. 124, 128-29 (Sup. Ct.
1927) (finding that the limitations period for conversion claim apparently had expired
because claim accrued when the right to make a demand was complete, but permitting
a contract claim because no breach of contract occurred until a demand was made for
return of property held by warehouseman). Foreshadowing Menzel and Guggenheim,
however, the court stated that the purpose of commencing the limitations period from

the time when the right to make a demand is complete was to protect "the debtor or
pledgor, or depositor, or one from whom property had been stolen rather than to
limit their rights or remedies." Id.
126. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 206(a) (McKinney 1990) (emphasis added).
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good faith purchasers into a sword for former owners.' 27 In an extremely brief, substantively, two sentence opinion, the court stated
that precedents "suggest" that a demand "is a substantive, rather than
a procedural, prerequisite to the bringing of an action for conversion
by the owner.... If that be so, then the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until demand and refusal."' 28 Apparently, the court concluded that when there is no tort until demand is made, i.e., that demand is "an essential element of the cause of action,"'129 section
206(a)-being a procedural rule-is inapplicable.' 30 The court provided no further elaboration or explanation.' 3 1 Although the court
did not address whether the former owner was required to exercise
reasonable diligence prior to locating the art, a later decision noted
that the Menzels had actively searched for the painting from the end
of World War 11.132 The court's decision may have been influenced by
the Menzels' victimization by the Nazis, as overtly-and understandably-reflected in a later decision,133 but the explanation given in that
later decision for imposing the loss caused by the Germans on the
innocent purchaser avoids the essential issues: "Throughout the
course of human history, the perpetration of evil has inevitably resulted in the suffering of the innocent, and those who act in good
faith." an
Several subsequent cases proceeded to ignore Menzel, applied section 206(a) to conversion claims, and commenced the limitations period from when the purchaser took possession-i.e., from the time
when the right to make demand was complete, rather than from the
time of actual demand and refusal.' 35 In at least one decision, the
127. See Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964); Petrovich, supra note
57, at 1136. The Menzels fled Brussels in 1941, leaving behind a painting by Marc
Chagall that was confiscated by the Nazis as "decadent Jewish art." Menzel v. List,
267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (Sup. Ct. 1966). The painting was purchased by List from the

well-known Perls Galleries; both List and Perls were good faith purchasers. Id.at 807.
128. See Menzel, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (citations omitted).
129. Frigi-Griffin, Inc. v. Leeds, 383 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (App. Div. 1976).
130. See Menzel, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 44.

131. For a detailed critique of Menzel on doctrinal and policy grounds, see Petrovich, supra note 57, at 1133-40.
132. The plaintiff discovered defendant's possession in 1962, whereupon demand
and refusal were made. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
133. Id. at 820 (referring to "the looting, plunder and pillage by the Nazis, which

was of the very essence of evil").
134. Id at 819. The various Menzel decisions are silent on whether the Menzels
did, or could have, pursued a reparations claim against Germany after the war,
although the complaint alleged that no compensation had been received from the
Belgian or German governments. Id.at 807.

135. See Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18, 22 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(stating in dictum that conversion limitations period for art works had long since run
because right to make demand was complete at the sale of the works in 1931 (citing
N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 206(a) (McKinney 1990))); Federal Ins. Co. v. Fries, 355

N.Y.S.2d 741, 747 (Civ. Ct. 1974) (holding that the limitations period under § 206(a)
ran from the time when the right to make demand was complete-when property was
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Court of Appeals held that a conversion claim against apparent good
faith purchasers commenced at the time of defendant's first use of the
property at issue, without addressing the applicability of the demand
and refusal rule or section 206(a). 136
Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon13 7 was the first case to
rely explicitly on Menzel's application of the demand and refusal rule
to the statute of limitations. Elicofon involved a suit in federal court
brought by an East German museum in 1969 against an American
collector to recover two paintings by the famed fifteenth-century German artist Albrecht Duerer. The paintings had disappeared during
World War II, and Elicofon had held them since 1946.138 The district
court analyzed New York's demand and refusal rule on the limitations
issue and concluded that Menzel correctly stated that, under New
York law, demand was a "substantive," not a "procedural" element of
a conversion claim, and that "the rule applied in Menzel is the existing
New York [conversion accrual] rule."'3 9 The court, however, recognized that Menzel had not resolved the question whether the demand
and refusal rule imposed a duty of reasonable diligence on the museum to attempt to locate the Duerers. 140 After discussion of this
open question, the court did "not decide this issue because the undisputed evidence clearly demonstrates that the [museum] made a diligent although fruitless effort to locate the paintings. There was no
unreasonable delay in making demand."''
The Second Circuit, in affirming, closely tracked the reasoning of
the district court on the statute of limitations issue. 4 2 The court rejected Elicofon's various arguments that Menzel's demand and refusal
rule is not or should not be the law of New York, based primarily on
its understanding of New York case law, not on grounds of policy or
transferred-despite the plaintiff's ignorance of the facts creating right to make a
demand. factual "ignorance does not stop the clock" (citations omitted)).
136. See Spon v. MCA Records, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (N.Y. 1983). The
lawsuit was filed 11 years after the subsequent purchasers began to use a master recording of a popular song. The purchasers were apparently unaware of plaintiff's
asserted rights. Id. at 1325-26. The court did not address specifically whether the
purchasers acted in good faith.
137. 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
138. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 830, 846.

139. Id. at 848-49 (criticizing both Fries and Stroganoff-Scherbatoff for applying
§ 206(a) and failing to distinguish between "procedural" and "substantive" demands).
As a federal court sitting in diversity, the court stated, "It is not this court's function
to improve upon, but only to follow New York law." Id. at 848; see Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
140. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 849-50.

141. Id (detailing efforts of museum to locate the missing Duerers). Although the
court did not directly address the issue, there was an obvious factual question whether
Elicofon was in fact a good faith purchaser, given that he paid $450 for the two Duerers to an ex-serviceman who appeared at his door in 1946. Id. at 833.
142. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160-64 & nn.20-25
(2d Cir. 1982).
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As the court noted, "[W]e are charged only with applying
New York law, not with remaking or improving it.'" 144 Elicofon, however, apparently did not press his claim that Menzel did not foreclose
imposing a due diligence requirement on former owners, presumably
because of the strong evidence of the museum's diligence.
The court,
45
consequently, did not directly address the issue.'
In DeWeerth v. Baldinger,146 the Second Circuit for the first time
looked behind Menzel and conducted a detailed analysis of the origins
of the demand and refusal rule and its impact on the commencement
of the limitations period. 47 DeWeerth, like Elicofon, involved a claim
for a valuable work of art that disappeared from Germany during
World War II, in this case a painting by Claude Monet. 148 The good
faith purchaser had held the painting for over 30 years without facing
a claim, although her identity was readily accessible through the Monet CatalogueRaisonne, available
a few miles from the plaintiff's resi1 49
dence near Cologne, Germany.
The Second Circuit acknowledged that Menzel stated the law of
New York, i.e., that demand and refusal was a substantive, not a procedural, element of a conversion claim and that the claim did not accrue until demand and refusal. 50 The court, however, found Menzel
to be the starting, not the end point of the inquiry, and answered the
question left open in Elicofon.15 1 In the absence of express state court
authority, the court construed the issue to be whether the New York
Court of Appeals would impose a duty of reasonable diligence on an
owner "prior to learning the identity of the current possessor," and
predicted (incorrectly, as it turned out) "that the New York courts
would impose a duty of reasonable diligence in attempting to locate
stolen property ...."I"
The court then discussed the reasons for this conclusion, including
that: several courts had held that "[w]here demand and refusal are
necessary to start a limitations period, the demand may not be unrea143. Id.
144. Id. at 1163. The court, however, did reject Elicofon's assertion that New York
law treats a good faith purchaser worse than a thief, arguing that New York's tolling
doctrine for fraudulent concealment would be construed broadly to prevent a thief
from invoking a statute of limitations defense. Id. at 1163 & nn. 23-24.
145. Id. at 1164 n.25 (assuming New York had a reasonable diligence rule, the museum had exercised reasonable diligence).
146. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
147. Id. at 106-10.
148. Id. at 104-05.
149. Id. at 105.
150. Id. at 106-07 & n.3.
151. Id. at 107-08.
152. Id. at 108. The court did not certify the issue to the New York Court of Ap-

peals, see N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.17 (1986), because it did not
believe (again, incorrectly) that the issue would recur with sufficient frequency.
DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108 n.5.
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sonably delayed;"' 53 the purpose of the demand and refusal rule is "to
protect the innocent" purchaser, not the owner, the unreasonable delay rule "serves to mitigate the inequity of favoring a thief over a
good-faith purchaser;" its interpretation is consistent with the fundamental statute of limitations policy of repose on behalf of defendants;
stolen art may frequently be recovered through investigation; and
commencing the limitations period from demand and refusal, regardless of diligence, is inconsistent with the law of all other jurisdictions. 154 The court then reviewed the evidence of DeWeerth's efforts
to locate the Monet, and determined that she was non-diligent as a
matter of 55law, particularly in her failure to consult the Monet
catalogue.
Rather than confront this history of the demand and refusal rule,
the56Court of Appeals in Guggenheim either ignored it or distorted
it.' The court treated its interpretation of the rule-that it is intended to protect former owners, not good faith purchasers, and that
it imposes no duty of diligence on the former-as non-controversial,
well-settled, and supported by the case law. Thus, the court asserted
that the demise of the Art Claim Bill, "when considered together with
the abundant case law spelling out the demand and refusal rule, convince us that the rule remains the law in New York and that there is no
reason to obscure its straightforwardprotection
of true owners by cre15 7
ating a duty of reasonable diligence.' 1
B.

Post-Guggenheim Cases

Since the Appellate Division's decision in Guggenheim, the Second
Circuit and Southern District have had occasion in four cases to apply
the Guggenheim demand and refusal statute of limitations rule in
favor of owners of long-lost art. In Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan
Museum of Art, 158 the claimant allegedly had actual knowledge of the
whereabouts of the artifacts for over 15 years. The court, however,
held that, under Guggenheim, the limitations period did not begin to
run until the formal demand and refusal. 159 Any delay went solely to
the issue of prejudice in the equitable defense of laches.'1
153. 1& (citations omitted). As the Court acknowledged, in each of the cited state
court cases, however, the delay in demand involved kmown defendants. Id. at 107-08.
154. Id. at 108-09.
155. 1& at 110-12.

156. In fact, Menzel is the only case the court cited that states that the statute of
limitations runs from demand and refusal
157. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 430 (emphasis added).
158. 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
159. Id.at 46.
160. Id at 46-47. The case settled with the Metropolitan Museum of Art agreeing
to return the artifacts to Turkey. Carol Vogel, Metropolitan Museum to Return Turkish Art, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1993, at C13.
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Likewise, in Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian Land Co. of
America,161 the court applied the demand and refusal rule to delay
commencement of the limitations period for the seventeen years that
the former owner was unaware or unable to make a demand for the
return of the treasure from allegedly innocent purchasers.162 Any
"unreasonable" delay was, again, only relevant to a laches defense. 16 3
In Hoelzer v. City of Stamford,164 Hoelzer, an art restorer, had been
commissioned by the General Services Administration ("GSA") to restore several murals created during 1934 under the auspices of the
Works Progress Administration. These murals had belonged to Stamford High School, a public school owned by the City of Stamford. 65
During a renovation of the school in 1970, the murals were thrown
into the garbage, only to be rescued by a student, who turned them
over to the GSA for restoration. 166 After Hoelzer had restored the
murals and stored them for eighteen years, all without payment, he
sought a declaratory judgment to quiet title to the works in 1989.167
Applying Guggenheim, the court held that the works belonged to
Stamford, as the demand and refusal had occurred in 1986, even
though Stamford had made virtually no efforts to ascertain the whereabouts, or even the existence, of the murals from 1970 until 1986.168
The fourth application of Guggenheim involved a procedurally unusual postscript to DeWeerth v. Baldinger.169 After the Court of Appeals' decision in Guggenheim, Ms. DeWeerth moved to recall the
Second Circuit's mandate and to vacate its judgment in light of Guggenheim's explicit rejection of the Second Circuit's decision in
DeWeerth. The Second Circuit denied her motion without comment,
but the Southern District granted her relief from the original judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and (6).'70
Following Guggenheim, the court found DeWeerth's claim timely,
held that the defense of laches did not bar plaintiff's claim, and ordered the Monet returned to DeWeerth. 171
The Second Circuit, however, reversed once again, this time on
legal issues of finality and DeWeerth's choice of a federal as opposed
161. 931 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1991).

162. Id. at 201.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1134.

167. Id. at 1134-35.
168. Id. at 1138-39. The court kindly referred to the city's investigation into the
location of the murals as "less than vigorous." Id. at 1138.
169. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
170. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 24 F.3d

416; Nos. 93-7144, 93-7146, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10850 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 1994)
(withdrawn), and amended after petitionfor reh'g, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1056 (1994).
171. 804 F. Supp. at 554-55 & n.13.
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to a state forum. 172 In essence, the court held that DeWeerth, by
choosing a federal forum, bore the risk that the federal court would
erroneously predict how an open question of state law would be resolved by the state courts and that the interest in finality in litigation

outweighed any perceived injustice to DeWeerth that resulted from
her poor choice of forum. 173
III.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GUGGENHEIM

It is easy to critique Guggenheim, flawed as it is on grounds of policy, precedent, and pragmatism. It is less easy to develop an alternative approach that balances the legitimate interests of the innocent art
theft victims-the former owner and the good faith purchaser.1 74 As
Guggenheim itself noted, there are a variety of alternative approaches
to New York's unique demand and refusal rule. These approaches
include: (1) a limitations period which commences at the time of
either the theft or the purchase; (2) a discovery rule, whether judi-

cially or statutorily created; and (3) statutory notice provisions. 175
172. 38 F.3d at 1272-75.
173. Id. In the withdrawn opinion, the court held that DeWeerth assumed the risk
of federal, rather than state, court adjudication of an open question of state law.
DeWeerth, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10850, at *20-21. In the amended opinion, the
court stated that DeWeerth "knew that any open question of state law would be decided by a federal as opposed to a New York state court." 38 F.3d at 1273.
174. The commentary that focuses on the question of the appropriate accrual rule
for commencing a statute of limitations for recovery of stolen art reflects a lack of
agreement similar to that found in the courts, although a majority of commentators
favor some version of the discovery rule. For example, commentators have advocated: Guggenheim's demand and refusal rule in conjunction with a laches defense,
see Drum, supra note 10, at 942; Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty Picture, 43 Duke LJ. 337, 383 (1993); variations on the
discovery rule, see Alexandre A. Montagu, Recent Cases on the Recovery of Stolen
Art-The Tug of War Between Owners and Good Faith Purchasers Continues, 18
Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 75, 101 (1993-94); Leah J. Eisen, Commentary, The Missing
Piece. A Discussion of Thef Statutes of Limitations and Ttle Disputes In the Art
World, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1067, 1100-01 (1991); Stephen L Foutty, Recent
Development, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.: Entrenchment of the Due Diligence Requirement in Replevin
Actions for Stolen Art, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1839, 1860 (1990); Stephen F. Grover, Note,
The Need For Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A
Comparative Study, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1431, 1466 (1992); Petrovich, supra note 57, at
1157-58; Webb, supra note 11, at 895-99; applying the doctrine of adverse possession
to personal property, see Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal
Property, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 119, 162-63 (1988-89); and the abolition altogether of any
statute of limitations and its replacement with a mandatory obligation on owners to
report stolen art promptly, see, Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of
Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 Yale LJ. 2437, 2468 (1994).
175. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991).
Other alternatives include affirmative defenses that have effects similar to limitations rules, such as adverse possession and transfer of good title. Detailed discussion
of these affirmative defenses are beyond the scope of this article, but they have serious flaws that make them unsuitable as realistic alternatives to the art theft statute of
limitations problem. Adverse possession is a doctrine traditionally associated with
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While preferable to the Guggenheim rule, none of these alternative
limitation doctrines is entirely satisfactory. As explained below, each
of these alternatives ultimately depends on either unfair allocation of
losses to one party or the other (accrual at the time of theft or
purchase), highly subjective, costly, and burdensome fact-intensive inquiries (the discovery rule), or schemes of limited application (statutory notice provisions).
A.

The TraditionalAccrual Rule

Historically, a replevin or conversion cause of action "ordinarily
will run against the owner of lost or stolen property from the time of
the wrongful taking."' 7 6 In jurisdictions following this rule, the former
owner must find the possession within a few years of the taking, or the
action is time-barred.' 77 As the Second Circuit noted in DeWeerth,
"Obviously, this creates an incentive to find one's stolen property."' 78
This traditional rule has two important advantages: certainty as to
when the limitations period commences and expires, at least for the

good faith purchaser, and simplicity of application in litigation. Unfortunately, the inequity of this rule to owners who are art theft victims, particularly those who diligently seek to recover their property,
outweighs these advantages. As noted, unlike most other types of
real property, although it has been infrequently applied to chattels. See, e.g., Gatlin v.
Vaut, 91 S.W. 38, 39 (Ind. 1905) (applying the elements of adverse possession in an
action for the recovery of mules); Lightfoot v. Davis, 91 N.E. 582, 583 (N.Y. 1910)
(stating that the doctrine of adverse possession may apply to chattels); Adams v.
Coon, 129 P. 851, 852 (Okla. 1913) (applying elements of adverse possession to
horse). The requirement of "open and notorious" possession-that the owner either
knew or should have known of the adverse possession-makes the doctrine particularly ill-suited to works of art and other personalty. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d
862, 871-72 (N.J. 1980) (rejecting the adverse possession doctrine as a viable method
of resolving disputes over stolen art because of the "open and visible" possession
problem); Petrovich, supra note 57, at 1140-49 (critiquing adverse possession doctrine
in context of stolen art).
As to the transfer of good title, under the U.C.C. and traditional canons of American law, a thief cannot transfer good title; therefore, a thief has "void" title and can
only pass this "void" title to subsequent good faith purchasers. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1)
(1987); supra note 7 and accompanying text. By contrast, when the owner has been
defrauded of his property, the "swindler" has "voidable" title and can pass good title
to the innocent purchaser. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1). While a strong case can be made
for treating good faith purchasers identically, regardless of whether the seller is a thief
or a swindler, equality and equity would likely result in both the thief and the defrauder having void, rather than voidable, title. It is unlikely that legislatures or
courts would modify this deeply embedded rule to make it easier for a thief to pass
good title. But see Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (stating that under Swiss law,
a thief can pass good title to a good faith purchaser), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.
1990).
176. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. 1980); see supra note 67.
177. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1056 (1988).
178. Id.
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personal property, art is easily hidden, may last for centuries, often
appreciates in value over time, and may be of enormous economic
value.' 79 Thus, whereas a traditional three-year rule may be appropriate in cases of perishable or semi-perishable items (e.g., horses,
automobiles), or with items of limited value, strict application of this
rule with respect to unique and valuable art could "encourage illicit
trafficking in stolen art."' 80
One way courts have mitigated the harshness of this rule-at the
expense of certainty and simplicity-is through the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, whereby the limitations period is tolled while the
chattel is fraudulently concealed from the owner. 81 The fraudulent
concealment doctrine, however, generally requires that both the location and possessor of the chattel be actively and fraudulently concealed from the owner, and not merely that the thief or purchaser fails
to identify himself or the fact of the theft to the owner.1's
B. The Discovery Rule
The harshness of the traditional rule has also been mitigated by
courts in several states through recent adoption of "discovery" rules
for actions concerning recovery of stolen art.s At least one stateCalifornia-has enacted by statute a discovery rule for stolen art
claims, and at least two states-Ohio and Oklahoma-have adopted
discovery rules for stolen property claims generally.181 The standard
discovery rule contains both a subjective and an objective component:
the statute of limitations begins to run when the former owner actually knew or reasonably should have known the whereabouts of the
179. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
180. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991).
181. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1391-92 & n.10 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th
Cir. 1990); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872-73 (N.J. 1980); General Stencils,
Inc. v. Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169, 170-71 (N.Y. 1966); Solomon P, Guggenheim Found.
v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991);
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitationsof Actions § 124, at 693; Allen & Lankin, supra note 66, at
851, 856.
182. See Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1392; General Stencils, 219 N.E.2d at 171;
Lightfoot v. Davis, 91 N.E. 582, 586 (N.Y. 1910). But see supra note 144 (discussing
Elicofon's theory that fraudulent concealment doctrine would be construed broadly in

cases of theft).

183. See, e.g., Goldberg,717 F. Supp. at 1391 (applying discovery rule to find that
plaintiff's failure to locate stolen art was reasonable due to fear of "physical harm or
destruction to human life or the art itself"); O'Keefte, 416 A.2d at 869-70 (finding that
discovery rule should be applied in replevin action for stolen painting "[t]o avoid
harsh results from the mechanical application of the statute [of limitations]); William
L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30 (5th ed. 1984). Courts first adopted
the discovery rule in cases of medical malpractice or exposure to toxic substances, in
which the plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the injury until substantially
later. The rule was later expanded to other areas of tort law. See O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d
at 869.
184. See supra note 68.
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chattel. This rule requires former owners to exercise reasonable diligence in searching for their stolen property.
The first decision to apply a discovery rule in a case involving stolen
art was O'Keeffe v. Snyder,'85 a replevin action brought by Georgia
O'Keeffe in 1976 to recover three paintings allegedly stolen from An
American Place in 1946.186 Over the years, O'Keeffe made sporadic,
informal efforts to locate the missing paintings.1 7 The paintings were
ultimately located in a gallery in 1975. The court reviewed the steady
expansion of the discovery rule under New Jersey law and held that
"[t]he discovery rule applies to an action for replevin of a painting....
O'Keeffe's cause of action accrued when she first knew, or reasonably
should have known, through the exercise of due diligence, of the cause
of action, including the identity of the possessor of the paintings."' 88
Because of numerous factual disputes, including the adequacy of
O'Keeffe's diligence, the court remanded for a plenary trial.' 89
Similarly, the district court in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 9 ' applied a discovery
rule in an action for the recovery of stolen art. The Republic of Cyprus and the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus commenced suit to
recover sixth-century Byzantine mosaics that had been looted from a
church in Turkish-occupied Cyprus sometime between 1976 and
1979."' In 1989, the plaintiffs discovered that the mosaics were in the
possession of defendant Goldberg in Indiana, and sued her soon
thereafter." 92 In concluding that a discovery rule was appropriate, the
court noted, "If a plaintiff is unable to determine the possessor of sto185. 416 A.2d 862 (NJ. 1980).

186. Id. at 865. An American Place was a renowned cooperative art gallery operated by O'Keeffe's husband, the photographer Alfred Stieglitz. Id.
187. Id. at 866. O'Keeffe discussed the matter with colleagues in the art world. The

theft was never reported to any law enforcement agency or insurance company, nor
was its loss advertised in any publications. In 1972, the theft was reported to the Art
Dealers Association of America, Inc., which maintains for its members a registry of
stolen paintings. Id.
188. Id. at 870.
189. Id. The trial court was directed to consider the following issues in determining
whether O'Keeffe was entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule:
(1) whether O'Keeffe used due diligence to recover the paintings at the time
of the alleged theft and thereafter; (2) whether at the time of the alleged
theft there was an effective method, other than talking to her colleagues, for
O'Keeffe to alert the art world; and (3) whether registering paintings with
the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. or any other organization
would put a reasonably prudent purchaser of art on constructive notice that
someone other than the possessor was the true owner.
Id.
190. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
191. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1377-79. Because of the Turkish occupation of the
northern part of Cyprus, including the expulsion of the Greek Cypriot population in
1976, the plaintiffs did not learn of the theft until 1979. Id. at 1378-80.
192. Id. at 1384-85. The case was tried to the court over several days in mid-1989.
Id. at 1377.
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len items, the plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action in replevin."193 The court, sitting in diversity and extrapolating as to the
result that an Indiana court would reach, held "that the plaintiffs'
cause of action did not accrue... until the plaintiffs, using due diligence, knew or were on reasonablenotice of the identity of the possessor of the mosaics." 1" The court then chronicled the extensive,
international efforts of plaintiffs to recover the mosaics as soon as they
learned of their disappearance in 1979. The court held that the limitations period was tolled until the mosaics were located in Goldberg's
possession and rewarded the mosaics to plaintiffs) 95
Whereas the discovery rules in O'Keeffe and Goldbergmitigated the
harsh impact on an innocent owner of the traditional statute of limitations that ran from the time of the theft or purchase, the Second Circuit in DeWeerth applied a discovery rule to mitigate the unfair impact
of New York's demand and refusal rule on the good faith purchaser.
The Second Circuit stated, "A construction of the rule requiring due
diligence in making a demand to include an obligation to make a reasonable effort to locate the property will prevent unnecessary hardship to the good-faith purchaser, the party intended to be protected"19 6
by the demand and refusal rule. 1 7 The court concluded that
DeWeerth's efforts to recover the stolen Monet were "minimal"' 98
and that her claim was therefore barred by the statute of
limitations. 199
The discovery rule, while certainly more equitable to purchasers
than Guggenheim's demand and refusal rule, still suffers from two of
the basic flaws of that rule, albeit to a lesser degree. First, under both
rules, the purchaser never has true repose from a claim by a former
owner, because there is no date certain from which the limitations period begins to run.200 Although the limitations period under a discovery regime theoretically commences when the former owner
reasonably should have discovered the location of the missing art, that
193. Id. at 1389.
194. Id. at 1388 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 1391,1405; see also Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2096, at *36 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995) (applying discovery rule to find that former
owners exercised reasonable diligence during 33 years between theft and recovery of
painting, despite minimal efforts between last contact with FBI in 1979 and registration with Art Loss Register in 1992).
196. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); see also 836 F.2d at 112 ("To require a good-faith
purchaser who has owned a painting for 30 years to defend under these circumstances
would be unjust.").
197. Id. at 108.
198. Id. at 111.
199. Id. at 112 & n.7.
200. See generally Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that
the discovery rule lacks a concise standard); Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 644
N.E.2d 1009, 1013 (N.Y. 1994) (criticizing accountant malpractice discovery rule for
its lack of "certainty and predictability").
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point in time is unknowable until it is determined in litigation.20 1 The
main difference between this aspect of the two accrual rules is that
under demand and refusal, the limitations period never runs prior to
actually locating the chattel, while under the discovery rule, the limitations period may commence running earlier. This fact, however,
would not be known to the purchaser prior to litigation, and thus, the
purchaser never has actual repose.202 Moreover, the uncertainty and
unpredictability inherent in the discovery rule is heightened because
the innocent purchaser's right to retain the art may well turn on a
sliding scale of diligence dependent on whether the former owner is
unfamiliar 3with the art world or is a sophisticated collector or a
20
museum.

Second, like the laches inquiry, "[d]etermination of due diligence is

fact-sensitive and must be made on a case-by-case basis., 2o0' Thus,
with the exception of cases of gross negligence, such as DeWeerth and
Guggenheim, the issue of due diligence will generally not be amenable
to resolution without extensive discovery and a trial.2 0 5 Nevertheless,
the discovery rule does have the advantage of avoiding the fact-inten201. See, e.g., DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107 n.4 ("[The discovery] rule, focusing on the
plaintiff's conduct, conceptually starts the limitations period at the point where the
plaintiff has had an opportunity to use due diligence in locating the property and
making a demand, and has failed to do so."); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v.
Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (App. Div. 1990) ("[I]t is questionable whether
DeWeerth purports to fix any particular time as the point of accrual."), aff'd, 569
N.E.2d 426 (1991).
202. Under the discovery rule, the purchaser has the ability to take steps to make it
more likely that the reasonably diligent owner would have located the chattel, such as
public display or publication. A private owner of valuable art, however, may not wish
to publicize his ownership for legitimate reasons such as fear of theft. Under the
demand and refusal rule, such public efforts are irrelevant. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430-31 (N.Y. 1991).
203. See Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *40 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 23, 1995) ("The discovery rule is fact-sensitive so as to adjust the level of
scrutiny as is appropriate in light of the identity of the parties; what efforts are reasonable for an individual who is relatively unfamiliar with the art world may not be reasonable for a savvy collector, a gallery, or a museum.").
204. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990). In
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991), the court
criticized the discovery rule on the ground that "the facts of this case reveal how
difficult it would be to specify the type of conduct that would be required for a showing of reasonable diligence." Id. at 430. The court added that "it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to craft a reasonable diligence requirement." Id. at 431. Nevertheless,
the court remanded the case for a trial of the laches issue, which required just such a
"difficult, if not impossible" determination of "reasonable diligence." Id.; see also
DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 110 (explaining that the determination of what constituted unreasonable delay is a fact-sensitive endeavor); Erisoty,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at
*33 (stating that the discovery rule is "highly 'fact-sensitive,' and flexible" (internal
quotations omitted)); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 873 (N.J. 1980) (stating that
due diligence is a case-specific inquiry); Petrovich, supra note 57, at 1150-52 (explaining the various factors required in an inquiry under the discovery rule).
205. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1389; O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870.
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sive scrutiny of the second prong of a laches defense-prejudice to the
defendant attributable to plaintiff's unreasonable delay.
C. Statutory Provisions and Proposals
Congress, the New York State legislature, and the European Union
("EU") have considered laws in recent years that address extremely
limited aspects of the stolen art statute of limitations problem. The
enacted federal legislation is limited to claims by foreign governments
concerning foreign "cultural property" imported into the United
States, while the New York bill, vetoed by the Governor, was limited
to art in the possession of specified not-for-profit institutions. The EU
law is limited to "cultural property" of one Member State found in
another Member State. Although none of these laws attempt to address the entire universe of stolen art claims, they each suggest that
the unique attributes of stolen art require innovative legislative
solutions.
1. The CPIA
In 1983, Congress enacted the Cultural Property Implementation
Act ("CPIA"), 2 6 the enabling legislation for United States implementation of the 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization ("UNESCO") Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property.2 7 The CPIA primarily addresses the Executive's authority to restrict the importation of, and to seize illegally imported, foreign cultural property.2 s The CPIA affords redress only to
foreign State parties to the UNESCO Convention through the Executive; it does not provide a private cause of action2 °9 Thus, the CPIA
is limited to an extremely small, albeit important, subset of potential
claims.
The CPIA also contains a complex statute of limitations that prevents State parties from recovering certain works previously imported
into the United States. 10 The CPIA appears to be the only statute of
limitations in the United States that specifically addresses the issue of
stolen art outside of traditional accrual rules. In order to be exempted
from recovery under the CPIA's limitations periods, the object must
be within the United States, and it must have been: (1) held for more
206. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1983). The CPIA protects "cultural property" and
"archaeological or ethnological material," as defined at 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2),(6).
207. 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972) (adopted Nov. 14, 1970, 16th Sess.), reprinted in
UNESCO's Standard-Setting Instruments, Incorporating Supp. 1, at IV.A.4 (1982).
208. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613.
209. See id.In contrast to typical conversion actions, under certain circumstances, a
prevailing State Party must pay a good faith purchaser the amount the purchaser paid
for the object. Id. § 2609(c)(1).
210. Id.§ 2611.
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than three years by a museum or similar institution which had
purchased the object in good faith, so long as the acquisition was reported in specified publications, the object was publicly displayed for
at least one year, or catalogued and made available to the public for at
least two years;21 ' (2) held for not less than ten consecutive years, with
public exhibition for at least five of those years;"' 2 (3) held for not less
than ten consecutive years and the foreign State Party received or
should have received fair notice of the location of the object; 213 or (4)
held for not less than 20 consecutive years
and the possessor can
214
prove good faith purchase of the object.
The latter three exemptions apply to cultural property held by individuals and dealers, not just museums or similar institutions. In addition, the second and third exemptions apply whether or not the
possessor was a good faith purchaser. These limitations periods appear to be arbitrarily selected, although fairly reasonable. They are
not based on any commonly used limitations doctrines, although the
last three exemptions are akin to an adverse possession defense.
Although the first three exemptions have superficial similarities to a
discovery rule, they focus almost exclusively on the acts of the possessor, not the claimant, as is the case under a discovery rule. 15 No reported cases have interpreted the limitations provision of the CPIA.
2. The New York Art Claim Bill
In 1986, in response to the demand and refusal statute of limitations
rule as articulated in Menzel, the New York State Assembly and Senate passed a bill that would have eliminated that rule for recovery of
art objects from certain governmental and not-for-profit organizations, including museums, open to the public or to students, and limited to works that had been acquired in good faith.21 6 The Art Claim
Bill specifically provided that a cause of action in replevin or conversion commenced upon the happening of the earliest of three specified,
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. § 2611(2)(A).
Id. § 2611(2)(B).
Id. § 2611(2)(C).
Id. § 2611(2)(D).

215. The third exemption is ambiguous as to whether the inquiry would focus on

what the State Party did to receive notice, or what the possessor did to provide notice.
Id. § 2611(2)(C).
216. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. The Art Claim Bill, unanimously approved by the New York State Assembly and Senate, would have created a
new section to the CPLR, § 214-d. "The purpose of the bill is to overrule the substantive demand requirement in Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 1964) and
create a specific time period when a cause of action accrues for recovery of an art
object from certain museums and not-for-profit institutions ....

."

Memorandum in

Support of Legislation, A. 11462-A (on fie with Fordham Law Review); see also
Drum, supra note 10, at 936 (discussing Art Claim Bill).
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affirmative notification procedures. 217 The three-year limitations period, however, would be tolled when the claimant could demonstrate
that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, he could not2have
discov8
ered the whereabouts of the object (the discovery rule). 1
Supporters of the Art Claim Bill pointed to the "quirk" in New
York law that gives the thief repose after three years, but not the good
faith purchaser, who is always subject to the former owner's demand. 19 Supporters also noted the long-term danger posed to the
state's great museums and private collections in the absence of any
repose to good faith purchasers2t
The Art Claim Bill, however, while intended to mitigate some of
the harm threatened by the demand and refusal rule, would have protected only a relatively small class of good faith purchasers. Its diffuse
and complex notification scheme would have been inadequate to provide actual notice to many theft victims. It also did not define good
faith purchasers, with the likely result that fact and discovery-intensive litigation would shift to that issue.
Although the Art Claim Bill unanimously passed both houses, several federal agencies and certain influential members of the art world
argued that the Art Claim Bill would encourage "laundering" of stolen foreign cultural property and turn New York into a haven for stolen art.z"i As a result of this opposition, the Governor vetoed the Art
Claim Bill 2 2
217. Art Claim Bill, supra note 70, § 214-d(a),(b). These procedures were: (1) the
first date of publication of the acquisition of the object by the entity in a publication
which regularly contains reports of acquisitions and has a circulation of at least 500, or
any regularly published national or multi-state newspaper or periodical, or any New
York publication with a circulation of at least 50,000, or a periodical or exhibition
publication which is concerned with the type of object acquired; (2) the first date of
continuous display of the object for at least 12 months in any 36-month period; or (3)
the first date of the cataloguing of such object, in a catalogue available to the public
upon request for three consecutive years.
218. Id § 214-d(d). The Art Claim Bill also included separate provisions depending on whether the acquisition was prior to 1976, after 1976 but prior to the Art Claim
Bill's effective date, or after the effective date. Id § 214-d(a),(b).
219. Letter from Paul M. Bator, Prof of Law, University of Chicago Law School, to
Gov. Cuomo (July 25, 1986) (on file in Bill Jacket of Art Claim Bill, supra note 70).
220. Letter from Thomas D. Nicholson, Director, American Museum of Natural
History, to Gov. Cuomo (July 7, 1986); letter from Carroll L. Wainwright, Jr., Partner,
vlbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, to Gov. Cuomo (July 28, 1986) (both letters on
fie in Bill Jacket of Art Claim Bill, supra note 70).
221. Molotsky, supra note 71, at C15. The Governor received letters and legal
opinions opposing the Art Claim Bill from the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Information Agency, IFAR, and other private
organizations and individuals. It has been noted that these federal agencies may have
their own agenda regarding foreign cultural property, they reportedly use art and
antiquities as bargaining chips in negotiations with developing nations in regard to
combating illegal drugs. See Stile, supra note 10, at 32 (noting that the U.S. began
using cultural property as bargaining chips during President Nixon's tenure).
222. Veto Message, supra note 71, at 863.
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3. The European Union Cultural Objects Law
An innovative, albeit limited, approach to the stolen art statute of
limitations problem is reflected in a recent EU law that provides for
the return of "cultural objects" unlawfully removed from any EU
Member State and found in another EU Member State. 23 If the
work was stolen within 75 years of its discovery, and the work is from
a public or church collection of any EU Member State, that nation
may demand the return of the work if found in another Member State,
and may sue the possessor for its return if the demand is refused.22 4 A
good faith purchaser, however, must be compensated by the requesting nation for the return of the work.225
In this respect, the new EU law resembles condemnation procedures for the taking of real property by the state.226 As in condemnation or eminent domain takings of real property, the requesting nation
may only "re-patriate" artwork of a public nature-i.e., art stolen
from a public collection or a church, or from private collections if the
object is classified as a "national treasure. ' '12 7
223. Council Directive 93/7, 1993 OJ. (L 74) 74 [hereinafter Council Directive];
Godfrey Barker, Good-Title Insurance Increasingly Necessary, ARTnewsletter, Dec.
28, 1993, at 5.
224. Council Directive, supra note 223, arts. 5, 7. If the cultural object is from a
private collection, suit must be brought within thirty years. Id. art. 7(1). Return proceedings must be commenced within one year after the requesting Member State became aware of the object's location. I&.
225. Id. art. 9. This approach is precisely the opposite of the reported settlement in
Guggenheim, in which the good faith purchaser paid the former owner the current
market value to retain the painting she had purchased over 25 years earlier. See supra
note 56.
226. The Council Directive law also requires Member States to cooperate with each
other and to notify other Member States when a cultural object that is believed to
have been unlawfully removed from another State is located. Id. art. 4.
227. Id. art. 1(1) & annex.
The U.S. State Department has been involved in negotiating a multilateral convention known as "UNIDROIT" that has similarities to the EU law, but which would
include private owner remedies for stolen "cultural objects", and which would also
permit Contracting States to seek recovery of illegally exported art, whether or not
stolen. Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft
Unidroit Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995 (on fie with FordhamLaw Review). As proposed, claims
for restitution "shall be brought within a period of three years from the time when the
claimant knew the location of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor, and
in any case within a period of fifty years from the time of the theft" or illegal export.
Id. arts. 3(3) (theft), 5(5) (illegal export). UNIDROIT also provides that a Contracting State may extend the limitations period for stolen cultural objects to 75 years
or longer, id. art. 3(5), and that certain categories of particularly important stolen
"cultural objects" shall be subject only to the three years from actual discovery rule.
Id. arts. 3(4), 3(8). As with the EU law, former owners would have to reimburse good
faith purchasers for the value of the work recovered. Id. arts. 4(1), 6(1). One factor in
determining whether the possessor obtained the object in good faith is whether the
possessor "consulted any reasonably accessible register of stolen cultural objects." Id.
art. 4(4). It is uncertain whether the State Department will support the convention
as currently drafted; the U.S. may support the provisions regarding stolen art, but
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AvAILABILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL STOLEN ART
REGISTRY

In its 1980 decision in O'Keeffe, the New Jersey Supreme Court lamented the absence of "a reasonably available method for an owner
of art to record the ownership or theft of paintings."
The court
recognized that an "efficient registry" of art works might better serve
the art community than arcane legal doctrines. 2 9 Unable to "man-

date the initiation of a registration system," the court resorted to the
discovery rule.230
Apparently unknown to the New Jersey Supreme Court, in 1976,
the non-profit International Foundation for Art Research, Inc.
("IFAR") 31 had begun to maintain a manual registry of stolen works
of art. For a fee, theft victims could register their stolen art and potential purchasers could inquire whether a proposed acquisition had
been registered as stolen. In addition, law enforcement agencies contacted the registry to determine if suspicious works of art had been
registered as stolen.
In the late 1980's, IFAR began to computerize its paper records in
order to make its searches more efficient and accurate. In 1991, FAR
joined with Sotheby's, Christie's, London-based insurance brokers,
and other British and American companies to establish the International Art & Antique Loss Register, Ltd. (the "Art Loss Register" or
"ALR"), a British for-profit corporation. The ALR has been emerging as the leading international clearinghouse for information on stolen art, and it demonstrates the technological feasibility of an
international computerized stolen art registry.
The ALR maintains a sophisticated computerized database in both
New York City and London with information and images of over
50,000 stolen art objects?232 Art theft victims or their insurers may
not the provisions related to the illegal export of art. Spencer P.M. Harrington,
UNIDROIT, Aimed at Europe, May be "Tough Sell" in U.S., ARTnewsletter, June 28,
1994, at 1-2 (commenting on prior draft of UNIDROlT); see also Barker, supra note
223, at 5 (stating that the U.S. is expected to sign a proposed provision requiring legal
owners to reimburse good faith purchasers). If adopted, UNIDROIT would effectively supplant the CPIA.
228. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (NJ. 1980).

229. 1L
230. I&
231. LFAR is a New York City-based organization dedicated to recovering and to
preventing the circulation of stolen, forged, and misattributed works of art.
232. Leonard W. Boasberg, Artful Sleuths, Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 7, 1994, at El. El0.
For a description of the operation and technology of the ALR computer system, see
Daly, supra note 1, at 21-23. "ALR taps multimedia technology, combining text,
sound, pictures and video in an interactive manner." Itd at 21. The system was also
installed for trial in Scotland Yard's Art Squad and at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. The Int'l Art & Antique Loss Register, Ltd., 199311994 Annual Review 5
(1994) [hereinafter Annual Review] (on file with Fordlumm Lav Review).
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register stolen art with the ALR for approximately $65 per item.233
Before the ALR will register a work, its theft must have been reported to the police and it must have a value in excess of $2000.3 4 In
addition, law enforcement agencies may register stolen objects. In
1993 alone, the ALR reported that almost 9000 items were
registered.235
The ALR also provides an Art Theft Search Service for buyers who
wish to determine if a work has been reported as stolen, as well as for
law enforcement officials who have come into possession of or are
aware of art work of a suspicious nature.3 6 The ALR charges potential buyers a $50 fee to search the registry to see if a work has been
reported as stolen; it does not charge a fee to law enforcement officials. In addition, the ALR conducts catalogue searches on behalf of
the major American and British auction houses, including Sotheby's,
Christie's, Phillips, Bonhams, and Butterfields. 23 7 The Metropolitan
Museum of Art announced in February 1994 that it would screen all
proposed acquisitions in excess of $35,000 with the ALR, and the J.
Paul Getty Museum regularly uses the ALR. 238 From 1991-93, the
ALR claims to have played a role in the recovery of
over 400 works of
239
art, 200 of which were recovered in one location.
V.

PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

A. Principles of the Proposed Legislation
Taking a cue from the New Jersey Supreme Court in O'Keeffe, this
Article proposes as an ultimate goal a national legislative solution to
the stolen art statute of limitations problem based on an international
stolen art registry such as the ALR. Ideally, an ALR-type registry
would be operated by the government-such as the FBI, the Library
of Congress, or the Smithsonian Institution-or by a nonprofit entity
(as it was initially). The ALR, however, is currently the only available
registry of its scope and quality, and this legislative solution should
not be deferred until a comparable government or nonprofit registry
is created." ° As an interim measure, this Article proposes that state
233. See IFARreports, Jan. 1994, at 16 (on file with Fordham Law Review).
234. Id. Approximately 240 insurance companies (including 120 syndicates at

Lloyd's of London) in the United States and Europe have entered into fixed fee ar-

rangements with the ALR that enable them to register any art losses of their insureds.
Annual Review, supra note 232, at 8, 19.
235. Id. at 8.

236. Id. at 9.
237. Id. at 2, 9.
238. Andrew Decker, Met Institutes Screening of Proposed Acquisitions, ARTnewsletter, Feb. 22, 1994, at 3.
239. Annual Review, supra note 232, at 10.

240. In the absence of a competing registry, legislation may need to include standards that address such issues as price-setting, confidentiality, and quality control. If
the ALR's for-profit status were to cause serious impediments to passage of legisla-
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legislatures, particularly in important art markets such as New York,
adopt this proposal.241 This proposal is premised on five basic
principles.
First, "art" is qualitatively different from other forms of personal
property, thereby justifying special innovative treatment under the
law. Second, both the former owner and the good faith purchaser are
by definition legally innocent of wrongdoing. Therefore, one innocent
party will likely gain at the expense of the other innocent party, particularly as the guilty parties-the thief and bad faith purchasers-will
rarely be available to compensate the victims. 242 Given that both parties are innocent, the burdens and responsibilities of locating stolen
art and discouraging its purchase should be allocated where they can
most easily and practicably be met. Third, unlike other legislative
proposals, the statute should cover as much of the stolen art universe
as is feasible. Fourth, pursuant to traditional canons of American law,
the former owner of the stolen property has superior title even as
against a good faith purchaser. Those rights, however, should be subject to a definite statute of limitations. As with virtually all other areas of American law, the art theft victim who sleeps on his rights
ultimately should lose those rights. Finally, the proposal should provide a substantial degree of certainty in result and simplicity in applition, then its current owners, as well as the major museums, insurance companies,
galleries, and auction houses that currently use the ALR should seriously explore
whether the ALR could be returned to its original non-profit status or whether a
competing non-profit registry is feasible.
241. A recent Note proposes prospective abolition altogether of the statute of limitations based on mandatory registration by the former owner with both the ALR and
law enforcement. See Bibas, supra note 174, at 2460-67. Under that exclusively
owner-focused proposal, an owner who registers faces no limitations bar;, an owner
that fails to register promptly (apparently within weeks for individuals, six months to
one year for museums) has no recourse against a good faith purchaser. Id. Although
the Note criticizes the notion that good faith purchasers are "innocent," id.
at 2453-54,
contrary to both fundamental legal doctrine and the facts of many of the stolen art
cases, the proposal itself is surprisingly harsh on non-registering and late registering
owners. That proposal also does not provide for the purchaser's use of the registry
retroactively-thus leaving out a vast universe of stolen art. It does not address the
use of the registry as a theft recovery mechanism, and it ignores some of the factual
nuances, such as the rights of subsequent purchasers, that the more balanced and
detailed proposal discussed further in this part attempts to address. The purchaser's
use of a centralized registry to commence the limitations period has previously been
suggested by James A.R. Nafzinger, Repose Legislation: A Threat to the Protectionof
the World's CulturalHeritage, 17 Cal. W. Int'l L J. 250, 264 (1987).
242. Former owners can mitigate their losses through loss insurance, but they will
still experience the loss of the unique work of art, perhaps higher premiums, and the
potential substantial increase in value over time. Art "title" insurance for purchasers,
however, is only available to a very few institutions, and is extremely expensive.
Barker, supra note 223, at 5. In some cases, as in the reported Guggenheim settlement, the purchaser might be able to mitigate his losses by recovering from the seller
who, however, may also be a good faith purchaser. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d
806, 807 (Sup. Ct. 1966); supra note 127 (discussing Menzei); supra note 56 (discussing
the Guggenheim settlement).
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cation, without unduly sacrificing fairness. One must, however,
recognize that no legislative solution can respond perfectly to all the
myriad permutations that exist in the stolen art universe.
B.

Prospective Legislative Proposal

Under this legislative proposal, both owners and purchasers would
be encouraged, but not required, to use one specified international art
theft registry, which would maintain a confidential record of the contact with the registry. Owners and purchasers who used the registry
would receive specified protections from the other party.
Former owners (or their insurers) who registered their stolen art
soon after the theft with both law enforcement and the registry would
receive protection from a statute of limitations defense from a subsequent purchaser. Either that subsequent purchaser consulted the registry and ignored the information that the work was stolen, or did not
consult the registry. 43 In either event, the purchaser would not be
considered a good faith purchaser under the terms of the statute, and
the purchaser's right to repose would be subject to the discovery
rule. 24" The statute could treat the registration as per se due diligence
(effectively eliminating a statute of limitations defense), or as creating
a strong, but rebuttable, presumption of due diligence.245
If the prospective purchaser consults the registry and the work is
not registered, the statute would consider him a good faith purchaser.
A confidential record would be kept of the inquirer's name and address and the location of the art. The statute of limitations would
commence running in favor of this purchaser at the time of the in243. A third possibility exists-that no match is found because the items are described differently or the registry made an error. The parties should be required to
provide sufficient detail to minimize these problems, and a purchaser should be required to pursue carefully evidence of a possible match. The registry would need to
be protected from liability for such errors.

244. For all the reasons discussed in this Article, the anomalous demand and refusal
rule should be abandoned altogether. The authors propose that the discovery rule be

treated as the "default" rule, i.e., when the specific procedures of the proposed statute
are inapplicable, the discovery rule would apply. Although permitting the bad faith
purchaser to invoke the statute of limitations may appear inequitable, it must be
remembered that under traditional limitations rules, an owner's claim runs from the
time of theft or bad faith purchase, absent fraudulent concealment. See supra notes
53, 120, 144, 181, and accompanying text. The discovery rule should also apply where

the registry erroneously failed to match a theft report with a purchaser's inquiry.
245. Making the presumption rebuttable has the advantage of creating incentives

for the owner to take additional steps that will increase the likelihood that the art will
be recovered, but also the disadvantages of the expensive and uncertain litigation that
is associated with the discovery rule. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
The concern with making the registration dispositive is that an owner could then take
no other steps for years, yet recover from a non-registering purchaser whose possession was so public that minimal efforts would have disclosed the object's location.
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quiry. 4 Subsequent good faith purchasers-those who checked the
registry and found the work not registered-would be able to tack on
the time period from the initial good faith purchase.247 Thus, three
years after the initial good faith purchase, the limitations period would
expire, and ownership would effectively vest in the current good faith
holder of the work who could then transfer good title to subsequent
purchasers.
This proposal also gives substantial protection to the former owner
who does not report the theft to the registry until after the good faith
purchase. The proposal permits the former owner in excess of three
years (i.e., from the time of the theft to the good faith purchaser's
inquiry, plus three years) to discover the theft, 2 register the stolen
art, and locate and bring suit against a prior good faith purchaser.
When an owner registers the stolen art work after a purchaser's inquiry, the registry would provide the former owner with identifying
information regarding the inquirer, the date of the inquiry, and the
then-location of the art. At that point, the diligent owner-with the
aid of law enforcement-should be able to locate the work relatively
quickly.24 9 Active concealment by the inquirer of the current possessor's identity or the location of the art when faced with such an inquiry would toll the limitations period.2s
Such an approach should also deter commerce in stolen art by encouraging purchasers and dealers to investigate provenance beyond
inquiry with the registry. Because the registered good faith purchaser
is at risk of discovery by the former owner for three years after registration (including that his identity and the location of the art is available to the former owner), he has strong incentives to take steps
beyond inquiring with the registry to determine provenance at the
time of purchase. For example, if "suspicious circumstances sur-

246. As noted, this is the accrual rule-although typically measured from the date
of purchase-followed in most jurisdictions. See supra part IILA.
247. The requirement that subsequent purchasers also consult the registry is intended to avoid a situation in which the former owner registers the work after the
initial good faith purchase but within the limitations period, and the possessor then
tries to sell the work to avoid recovery by the former owner. Regardless, registration
by the former owner more than three years after the initial purchaser's inquiry would
be ineffective against subsequent purchasers.
248. Although large institutions may not immediately discover theft of works in
their possession, particularly those not on display, see, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim
Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. 1991), this proposal gives these institutions both a reasonable time to determine that a work is missing and an incentive to
adopt technologies designed to keep track of their collections.
249. See, e.g., Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *16
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995) (stating that painting, stolen in 1960, was recovered within six
weeks of IFAR report to FBI in 1993 that stolen painting had been seen by museum
curator in 1989).

250. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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rounded the sale,"'2 5 1 the purchaser would be well-advised to investigate further, lest he be forced to relinquish the object two or three
years down the road.
Moreover, because the good faith purchaser can maintain an action
against the seller, 5 2 reputable professional dealers and auction houses
would have a strong incentive to investigate the art's provenance prior
to their own purchase or sale on consignment. This investigation
would reduce the likelihood that the seller is dealing in stolen art and
that the seller would be subject to a third party suit within the next
three years. This contrasts with the present situation, where a dealer
selling a work of questionable provenance to a good faith purchaser
may reasonably choose to take the risk that the former owner will not
discover the location of the object, and that even if the owner does
fortuitously discover the work in a decade or more, the dealer may be
unavailable, judgment-proof, or otherwise not liable.
To encourage use of the registry, it is crucial that the information
provided be kept confidential, with the following exceptions: (1) the
registry should notify the prospective purchaser that the work has
been reported as stolen, but identifying information as to the former
owner should be disclosed to the purchaser only at the owner's option;
(2) the registry should report the prospective purchaser's inquiry of a
stolen work of art, including identifying information, to the owner or
the owner's insurer, and appropriate law enforcement; and (3) the
registry should report the owner's report of stolen art to5 3law enforcement authorities if the owner has not already done so.2
Additionally, the registry should be fully financed by inquiring owners and purchasers. User fees should include an amount sufficient for
national and international promotion of the registry, because the registry's utility is dependent on worldwide notice of its availability.
Although worldwide dissemination of the existence and role of the
registry may appear at first blush to be an insurmountable task, the
realities of the art world, particularly as to currently valuable art,
greatly ease the effort. The ALR, for example, although in existence
for only a few years, already has a strong international presence, at
least in the West." 4 Dissemination of information regarding the registry through trade publications targeted at museums, universities and
similar institutions, art dealer associations, auction houses, insurers,
collectors, and law enforcement agencies would effectively reach the
251. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
252. See, e.g., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 1987) (impleading

gallery owner), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 743
(N.Y. 1969) (same); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618
(App. Div. 1990) (same), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 426 (1991).

253. Alternatively, report of the theft to law enforcement officials could be a precondition of registration, as ALR currently requires.
254. See supra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
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great majority of parties who play a significant role both in legitimate
art transactions and in the reporting and recovery of stolen art.
Owners may choose not to use the registry for a number of reasons-the object is not valuable enough, insurance proceeds have
been recovered, 25 the former owner considers it unlikely the art will
turn up in a jurisdiction in which registration is relevant, or he is simply negligent. As noted, if the purchaser has consulted the registry
and the owner has not, for whatever reason, the former owner's cause
of action would expire three years after the purchase.
Purchasers may also choose not to consult the registry for several
reasons-for example, they may realize the provenance of the art is
questionable and they do not want to risk revealing their identities to
the police or the owner, or they are simply negligent.256 In these
cases, and where the former owner has previously reported the stolen
art, the owner should be the beneficiary of the rules set forth above.
In cases in which neither party registers, the most appropriate rule
would be a discovery rule. With a discovery rule, the non-registering
owner must be diligent in other ways, while the non-registering purchaser runs the risk that the diligent owner could recover the property
in ten, twenty, or thirty or more years after purchase. The uncertainties for both parties of a discovery rule create an added incentive to
use the registry.
C. Retroactivity and Other Issues
The three primary difficulties with the proposal concern: (1) when
one party registers and the other party is reasonably unaware of the
registry; (2) whether to apply the proposed statute retroactively; and
(3) the "gap" problem, in which the innocent purchaser consults the
registry, but the former owner subsequently registers the art within
the limitations period and claims the art.
The easiest way to deal with the first issue is not to create any special exemptions and to treat the non-registering owner or purchaser
the same as any other non-registering party, as set forth above. There
may be cases, however, in which it is truly unfair to expect the owner
or purchaser, particularly individuals in developing countries, to be
aware of the registry. The standard in such cases should be whether a
reasonably diligent owner, who affirmatively seeks to recover his
property, or a reasonably diligent purchaser investigating the provenance of the object, knew or reasonably should have known of the
255. Insurers presumably could then either register the object, pursuant to standard
insurance provisions whereby the insurer takes title to the stolen object upon payment to the insured, or require the owner to register the stolen object.
256. In many transactions, the provenance of the art may be so certain or the market value of the art so minimal that the purchaser sees no reason to consult the
registry.
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existence of the registry. 57 The burden should be on the party asserting the exception, but where the exception does apply, the courts
should use the discovery rule to measure the limitations period.
As to retroactivity, the easiest approach again would be to make the
statute non-retroactive, except to the extent of overruling Guggenheim and retroactively applying a discovery rule. This would, however, leave decades of stolen art (and tens of thousands of valuable
objects) outside the scope of the registry system. This article, therefore, proposes that former owners (or their insurers) of art that was
stolen prior to the statute's effective date be afforded the opportunity
to register the object within a reasonable "window" (for example, two
years after the effective date) to obtain the statute's benefits. This
registration, however, would necessarily be inapplicable to the rights
of possessors at the time of the effective date (although it could be
evidence of diligence), 258 because it is unreasonable to expect present
possessors of art to check all their current possessions against the
registry.259
Such registration by former owners (or failure to register), however,
would operate against subsequent purchasers. Thus, if the subsequent
purchaser consults the registry and the object is not registered, the
statute would run from that date.2 60 Likewise, if the former owner
registers and the subsequent purchaser does not, the rules discussed in
part V.B. would apply and the registration would be either presumptive or dispositive evidence of diligence from the time of registration.
The former owner's registration, however, should not revive any
rights that the owner had lost under a discovery regime if it had been
non-diligent during the years from the theft to the registration. In
such events, the owner's registration would be a legal nullity. Otherwise, an anomolous situation would exist, whereby the former owner
could not recover against the original good faith purchaser, yet the art
would be unmarketable. In such situations, a present holder or subsequent purchaser could bring a claim to quiet title, and prevail on a
showing that, prior to the statute's enactment and subsequent registration, the former owner had been non-diligent and the limitations period had run.26 '
257. The inquiry should not be whether the party understood the legal consequences of registering or not registering.
258. Claims against present possessors should be controlled by the discovery rule.
259. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, for example, holds over 3 million art ob-

jects, of which one third are on exhibit at any given time.
260. If the current possessor chose to consult the registry, then he should receive
the same protections as any other registering purchaser.
261. To illustrate the somewhat complex retroactivity provisions by way of examples, assume the following facts: a painting is stolen from Owner (0) in 1970 and has
been held by a good faith Purchaser (P) since 1980, and the statute's effective date
(January 1, 1997) has passed:
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The third problem-what might be termed the "gap" probleminvolves the apparent unfairness to the good faith purchaser who consults the registry, finds the art is not registered, pays fair market value,
and then is forced to return the object when the former owner subsequently (but within three years of the registration) learns of its location. This result, however, is not a function of the proposed statute,
but of the Anglo-American rule that provides that the thief cannot
pass good title to the good faith purchaser and that the former
owner's title remains superior to the purchaser's within the limitations
period. As noted,' 62 this result also increases incentives for the seller
and the purchaser to investigate provenance beyond registration. Because this proposal shortens and defines the limitations period, it does
potentially mitigate this unfairness to the purchaser in two ways. First,
the purchaser's chances of recovering against a solvent seller is greatly
enhanced because the purchaser's liability runs only three years. Second, because title insurance would only be needed for three years, the
likelihood that such insurance would be made more generally available and affordable should increase.
As mentioned, this legislative proposal cannot address every stolen
art permutation, nor can it eliminate all harm to an innocent party.
However, through the use of widely available, relatively low cost technology, this proposal allocates burdens, rights, and duties far more equitably and pragmatically than current limitations rules, while at the
same time encouraging the recovery of stolen art and deterring the
stolen art trade.
1. Neither 0 nor P uses the registry. O's rights against P are governed by the discovery rule, based on O's diligence since 1970. O's nonregistration would be evidence
of non-diligence.
2. 0 registers the painting but P does not. O's rights against P are governed by the
discovery rule. O's registration would be evidence of diligence, but if 0 had not been
diligent since 1970, the registration could not restore O's lost rights.
3. P registers, but 0 either does not register or 0 registers after P. 0 will be notified of P's registration. 0 must bring suit against P within three years of P's rpgistration. O's rights will depend on O's diligence since 1970, as in #2.
4. 0 registers, then P registers. 0 will be notified of P's registration. P does not
"become" a bad faith purchaser. O's rights are governed by the discovery rule, based
on O's diligence since 1970, as in #2.
Now, assume P sells to P2 after January 1, 1997:
5. 0 registers before P 2 checks the registry. P2 cannot be a good faith purchaser
under the statute. O's rights against P 2 are governed by the discovery rule, with registration a presumption of diligence. However, if 0 was non-diligent since 1970, O's
rights are not restored against P2 by O's registration.
6. P2 registers; 0 either does not register or registers after P2. 0 has three years
from P 2's registration to sue. If 0 was nondiligent since 1970, 0 cannot recover even
if the suit is brought within three years of P 2's registration, as in #5.
7. P registers and sells to P 2, who also registers. 0 either does not register or registers after P2. 0 has three years from P's registration to sue P2. Even then, O's rights
against P2 depend on O's diligence since 1970.
262. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

CONCLUSION

New York's demand and refusal rule, as interpreted in Guggenheim,
unfairly rewards non-diligent former owners and punishes innocent
purchasers. The rule is legally and logically unsound, fails to recognize that two innocent parties are involved, and is premised on a fundamental lack of understanding of the workings of the art world. It
injects such an element of uncertainty into ownership interests in art
that it threatens to disrupt commercial art dealings in New York and
to burden the court system with long stale claims. Although alternative traditional limitations doctrines are more preferable to Guggenheim, they also have significant shortcomings of their own. Given the
unique attributes of stolen art, this Article proposes an innovative legislative solution based on a registry system that incorporates modern
computer technology. This proposal imposes reasonable diligence
burdens on all parties and losses on the parties that can best avoid or
mitigate them. If adopted by Congress or by state legislatures, particularly those with important art markets and collections in their jurisdictions, it will, we believe, go a long way in bringing repose to holders
of art and will increase the likelihood that former owners will locate
and recover their stolen art. At a minimum, the New York legislature
should overrule Guggenheim at the earliest opportunity and replace
the demand and refusal rule with a more equitable discovery rule.

